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Can Congress Make a President Step Up a War?
Charles Tiefer
I. INTRODUCTION
May Congress use its appropriation power to direct the
President to step up a war?t When Congress uses its spending
power for intensifying a war-stepping it up, pressing it more
aggressively-against the resistance of a "less hawkish"
Commander in Chief, who wins?
The subject of spending provisions, also called appropriation
riders, that limit the scope or duration of a war has certainly
received commentary. 2 By contrast, no one has discussed
Congress's use of its spending power to compel the President to
step up action in the war zone. Yet constitutional collisions about
stepping up wars do occur and will occur again. Moreover, this
new subject stimulates a reconsideration of the constitutional
Copyright 2011, by CHARLES TIEFER.
* Commissioner, Commission on Wartime Contracting in Iraq and
Afghanistan; Professor, University of Baltimore Law School; B.A., summa cum
laude, Columbia College, 1974; J.D., magna cum laude, Harvard Law School,
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website, http://www.wartimecontracting.gov. The author appreciates the special
assistance of Michael Glennon and Peter Raven-Hansen and the assistance of
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1. For general treatments of the subject, see WILLIAM C. BANKS & PETER
RAVEN-HANSEN, NATIONAL SECURITY LAW AND THE POWER OF THE PURSE
(1994); Louis FISHER, PRESIDENTIAL WAR POWER (2d ed. 2004); THOMAS M.
FRANCK ET AL., FOREIGN RELATIONS AND NATIONAL SECURITY LAW: CASES,
MATERIALS AND SIMULATIONS (3d ed. 2008); MICHAEL GLENNON,
CONSTITUTIONAL DIPLOMACY (1990); Louis HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND
THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION (2d ed. 1996).
2. Four years ago, the author wrote about appropriation riders to restrain or
end a war, with citations to previous studies of the subject. Charles Tiefer, Can
Appropriation Riders Speed Our Exit from Iraq?, 42 STAN. J. INT'L L. 291 (2006).
3. That is not to say there is no literature on kindred subjects, e.g., when
Congress may enact mandatory appropriations that a President must spend. In
addition, there has been one recent article mentioning one particular, relatively
obscure way that Congress might get around Presidents who do not wage a
particular kind of war. William Young, Note, A Check on Faint-Hearted
Presidents: Letters of Marque and Reprisal, 66 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 895, 911-
12 (2009).
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history of appropriation riders about wars generally, which makes
it both a relevant and an important topic.4
As a commissioner on the federal Commission on Wartime
Contracting in Iraq and Afghanistan established in 2008 by
Congress, the author has been immersed in the practical interactions
between congressional legislation and the conduct of the
Afghanistan war. Such experience generates realistic hypotheticals
demonstrating how this long, frustrating war may trigger future war-
powers clashes in which Presidents get pressed to act "more
hawkishly." Practically speaking, such clashes may occur whenever
the opposition to the President becomes as strong in Congress as it
did, most recently, from 1995-2000 and 2007-2008.
This Article posits differences of view in the 2010s toward the
Afghanistan war as a way to revisit, generally, the history of
constitutional disputes over war-related appropriation riders.
Describing the differences in very simplistic terms,5 a "hawkish"
opposition in Congress may gain political strength at any time,
such as in 2010 or 2014, not necessarily because of the war issues
but perhaps from running on a political platform in which a
4. This Article builds on impressive recent work that shows congressional
war powers far stronger than argued by those supporting the positions taken by
President George W. Bush. See David J. Barron & Martin S. Lederman, The
Commander in Chief at the Lowest Ebb-Framing the Problem, Doctrine, and
Original Understanding, 121 HARV. L. REv. 689, 756-57 & n.201 (2008)
[hereinafter Barron & Lederman, Framing the Problem]; David J. Barron &
Martin S. Lederman, The Commander in Chief at the Lowest Ebb-A
Constitutional History, 121 HARv. L. REv. 941 (2008) [hereinafter Barron &
Lederman, A Constitutional History]; Jules Lobel, Conflicts Between the
Commander in Chief and Congress: Concurrent Power over the Conduct of
War, 69 OHIO ST. L.J. 391 (2008).
5. It is not suggested that wars in general, and the Afghanistan war in
particular, fall simplistically into the dichotomies or hypotheticals being
discussed. Some members of Congress who otherwise have sterling "hawkish"
credentials-they favored maximum efforts in past wars and support full-sized
military budgets-might think the United States would do better just to get out
of Afghanistan. Conversely, members of Congress who otherwise have "dovish"
credentials and usually support any President under "hawkish" criticism might
join the "hawks" on particular issues that appeal to them, like eradication of
opium poppies. A policy discussion about this would have to concern far more
fleshed-out facts and would be nuanced. It is only for illuminating the general
constitutional law of war powers that simplistic dichotomies and hypotheticals
will serve. For these, too-fine political and policy distinctions would be
distracting.
6. For the author's previous discussion of this pattern in the midterm
congressional elections of Presidents' second terms-a 2004 prediction which
proved correct in 2006-see CHARLES TIEFER, VEERING RIGHT: How THE BUSH
ADMINISTRATION SUBvERTS THE LAW FOR CONSERVATIVE CAUSES 315-16
(2004).
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"hawkish" view of the war is one of the platform's explicit or
implicit planks.7 An elected "hawkish" majority in Congress may
want to use tougher measures in the theatre of war than the
President. It would enact measures past the bounds of policy set by
the President as its way to step up the war.
Meanwhile, a relatively "less hawkish" President may oppose
the steps demanded by Congress. As Professor Gregory Sidak
noted, "[t]oday, of course, we are so accustomed to thinking of
Presidents as more hawkish than Congress that the hypothetical" of
a "more hawkish" Congress "would strike many as preposterous.
Yet history provides a number of commonly ignored examples."
This Article will mention those examples in their historical
contexts.
Consider how, in 2009, when General McChrystal proposed to
commit more troops to Afghanistan, Republican congressional
leaders called for General McChrystal to come to Congress and to
testify prior to the President's decision.9 Those leaders also called
for "full" approval of the general's proposal.10 The dispute
7. The Republican majority of the House starting with the 1994 election
did not become strong primarily, or even significantly, because of its position,
discussed below, that American troops should not serve under a U.N. flag. Yet,
once that Republican majority became strong from the rest of its platform
(primarily domestic issues), that meant it had strength for its position on
controversies over the military serving under a U.N. flag.
8. Gregory Sidak, To Declare War, 41 DUKE L.J. 27, 85-86 (1991).
Professor Sidak more particularly noted:
Today, of course, we are so accustomed to thinking of Presidents as
more hawkish than Congress that the hypothetical of a dovish President
would strike many as preposterous. Yet, history provides a number of
commonly ignored examples: John Adams resisted calls for a
declaration of war against France in 1798 and instead sought authority
for the limited and undeclared Quasi-War; James Madison was
ambivalent about declaring war on Britain in 1812; Grover Cleveland
in 1896 rebuffed the proposal by various members of Congress to
declare war on Spain; William McKinley in 1898 reluctantly conceded
to the same war fervor; and Woodrow Wilson successfully campaigned
for reelection in 1916 on the slogan, "He kept us out of war."
Id. (footnotes omitted). The 1990s include the example, discussed below, of a
Congress that opposed overseas interventions during which troops served under
a U.N. flag. In the general environment of seeing the U.N. as committed to
"softer" approaches like nation-building and similar action in concert with
developing countries, and the U.S.'s commitment to "harder" approaches such
as the 1991 Gulf War campaign crushing Saddam Hussein's armed forces, the
U.N. flag issue was, loosely speaking, about how "hawkish" to be.
9. Ann Scott Tyson, Gates to Boost "Enablers" in Afghanistan Mission,
WASH. POST, Sept. 18, 2009, at A18.
10. Karen DeYoung, Afghan Policy Battle on Horizon: General's Call for
More Troops Divides Military and Policymakers, Hous. CHRON., Sept. 22,
2009, at Al.
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adumbrated situations in which a working majority in Congress
may take a more "hawkish" view than the Commander in Chief,
who does not want such anticipatory testimony and who wants a
different approach than merely giving such "full" approval. Such
disputes are the stuff that constitutional clashes are made of.
Looking at the kinds of examples considered in this Article,
suppose Congress passes a mandatory appropriation of several
billion dollars for moving militarily, as America has so often
done," against nearby border "sanctuaries,"' 2 in this instance those
of the Taliban in Pakistan. Pakistan's own increasing willingness
in 2010 to challenge the Taliban made this less unthinkable than
before. Suppose Congress creates a highly intrusive Select
Committee on the War in Afghanistan that pulls generals off the
battlefield into the hearing room to "unleash" them so that they
will be more aggressive than their President.14 Or, suppose
Congress enacts a mandatory appropriation' for a program of
11. Examples from the Indochina War and the Korean War are discussed
below. Other examples include a long history of "hot pursuit" and other moves
across the boundaries of the continental United States. "Examples extend from
President Monroe's orders to General Jackson in 1818 to pursue Indians in the
South into Spanish territory of Florida to President Wilson's dispatch of troops
in 1916 to pursue the Pancho Villa bandits across the Mexican border." Note,
Congress, the President, and the Power to Commit Forces to Combat, 81 HARv.
L. REV. 1771, 1789 (1968). For a more general treatment of the subject, see
Note, International Law and Military Operations Against Insurgents in Neutral
Territory, 68 COLuM. L. REV. 1127 (1968).
12. The example derives from the enormously controversial decision of
President Nixon, during the Vietnam War, to send troops into Laos and
Cambodia to clear out "border sanctuaries" and the responses from a
Democratic Congress to enact appropriation limitations preventing further war-
expanding incursions. Barron & Lederman, Framing the Problem, supra note 4;
Timothy Guiden, Defending America's Cambodian Incursion, 11 ARIZ. J. INT'L
& COMP. L. 215 (1994).
13. The notion that Pakistan has border sanctuaries for the Taliban in
Afghanistan is discussed in SETH G. JONES, IN THE GRAVEYARD OF EMPIRES:
AMERICA'S WAR IN AFGHANISTAN (2009); AHMED RASHID, DESCENT INTO
CHAOS: THE U.S. AND THE DISASTER IN PAKISTAN, AFGHANISTAN, AND
CENTRAL ASIA (rev. paperback ed. 2009).
14. The example discussed below derives from the Committee on the
Conduct of the War during the Civil War. It contrasts with highly regarded
committees, such as Senator J.W. Fulbright's performance of invaluable, if
belated, oversight on the Vietnam War. See Robert J. Reinstein & Harvey A.
Silverglate, Legislative Privilege and the Separation of Powers, 86 HARV. L.
REV. 1113, 1152 & n.204 (1973).
15. Congress words most war appropriations as lump sums as to which the
President has limited legal discretion, in consultation with the appropriation
committees, to redistribute sums away from certain programs. However,
Congress may choose words of a mandatory nature that take away the
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spraying defoliants on areas of opium poppy cultivation under
Taliban control, a step that clashes with the executive policy (in the
Bush and Obama administrations alike) of not wanting to force the
local poppy farmers to join Taliban forces.
This Article does not look at such hypotheticals, of course, to
discuss their policy implications.16 Rather, the discussion seeks to
develop the analytical structure about whether a "hawkish"
Congress may constitutionally enact various kinds of provisions.
The provisions at issue have been chosen so as not to aim at
restricting war- rather, these make a reluctant Commander in Chief
step up a war.
Accordingly, Part II of this Article provides the constitutional
history of Congress's war appropriation riders. It develops the key
background events, shedding a special light on the Framers' intent
in wording the potent "No Appropriation" provision in the
negative so that Congress would have a great power to limit, not to
force, action.' 8 Proper apropriation riders derive great support
from the plenary nature, venerable history,20 and contemporary
significance2 1 of Congress's power of the purse.22
President's legal discretion to withhold funds from a program. The question then
becomes one of presidential impoundment. See infra Part IV.D.
16. To repeat, the views expressed here are not those of the Commission or
any other Commissioner. In fact, they are also not views, as to the policy issues
regarding poppy eradication and so on, of this Commissioner. These are pure
hypotheticals posed in order to ground the constitutional analysis.
17. Some may ask whether Congress is ever more "hawkish" than a
President. The short answer is: several times Congress has declared war when
the President would probably have preferred peace. Stand-out examples include
the push on President Madison from the congressional "war hawks" in 1812 and
the push on President McKinley from the empire-minded congressional
Republicans in 1898. See supra note 8.
18. Even the strong believers in presidential power would let Congress
prevent or stop an intervention by denying it funding. John C. Yoo, Kosovo,
War Powers, and the Multilateral Future, 148 U. PA. L. REv. 1673 (2000).
19. Raoul Berger, War-Making by the President, 121 U. PA. L. REv. 29, 78-
79 (1972); Louis Fisher, How Tightly Can Congress Draw the Purse Strings?,
83 AM. J. INT'L L. 758 (1989); Michael J. Glennon, Strengthening the War
Powers Resolution: The Case for Purse-Strings Restrictions, 60 MINN. L. REV. 1
(1975).
20. See, e.g., Jules Lobel, Covert War and Congressional Authority: Hidden
War and Forgotten Power, 134 U. PA. L. REv. 1035 (1986).
21. FRANCIs D. WORMUTH & EDWIN B. FIRMAGE, To CHAIN THE DOG OF
WAR: THE WAR POWER OF CONGRESS IN HISTORY AND LAW (2d ed. 1989).
22. Kate Stith, Congress'Power of the Purse, 97 YALE L.J. 1343 (1988).
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Opposed to this expansive view of Congress's power of the
purse is the overall classic23 and contemporary4 stance of maximal
presidential war powers. 25 This pro-executive stance supports26 the
Commander in Chief power, especially in "an active theater of
war."27 This position also draws strength from past presidential
pronouncements2 8 and from the more general "executive Power"
clause.29
Crucial developments leading up to World War II show the
range of what Congress may try to do. After 1945, America
became a truly global power, with many more interested in raising
the issue of Congress authorizing vel non military action.o For
three key decades, the "Imperial Presidency" grew.31 This even
included an occasional battle over impoundment of military
appropriations 32 between the President 33 as Commander in Chief4'
and Congress. 35
23. Robert H. Bork, Erosion of the President's Power in Foreign Affairs, 68
WAsH. U. L.Q. 693 (1990); J. Gregory Sidak, The President's Power of the
Purse, 1989 DUKE L.J. 1162.
24. John C. Yoo, The Continuation of Politics by Other Means: The
Original Understanding of War Powers, 84 CAL. L. REv. 167 (1996).
25. See, e.g., Philip Bobbitt, War Powers: An Essay on John Hart Ely's War
and Responsibility: Constitutional Lessons of Vietnam and Its Aftermath, 92
MICH. L. REv. 1364 (1994); Sidak, supra note 8.
26. See, e.g., Michael B. Mukasey, National Security and the Rule of Law,
32 HARv. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 831 (2009); John C. Yoo, War and the
Constitutional Text, 69 U. CHI. L. REv. 1639 (2002).
27. Boumediene v. Bush, 523 U.S. 723, 770 (2008) (noting that the
detention facility was not "located in an active theater of war").
28. Executive pronouncements are collected in Robert J. Delahunty & John
C. Yoo, The President's Constitutional Authority to Conduct Military
Operations Against Terrorist Organizations and the Nations That Harbor or
Support Them, 25 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 488 (2002). Although many of those
statements occurred in contexts where they did not justify a challenged
executive intervention, some did. See, e.g., 112 Cong. Rec. 5504 (1966) (report
of the Office of the Legal Adviser, U.S. Department of State).
29. Steven G. Calabresi & Saikrishna B. Prakash, The President's Power to
Execute the Laws, 104 YALE L.J. 541 (1994); Robert F. Turner, War and the
Forgotten Executive Power Clause of the Constitution: A Review Essay of John
Hart Ely's War and Responsibility, 34 VA. J. INT'L L. 903 (1994).
30. See, e.g., William S. Cohen, Congressional Oversight of Covert
Actions: The Public's Stake in the Forty-Eight Hour Rule, 12 HARv. J.L. & PUB.
POL'Y 285 (1989); Christopher M. Ford, Intelligence Demands in a Democratic
State: Congressional Intelligence Oversight, 81 TUL. L. REv 721 (2007).
31. William G. Howell, Wartime Judgments ofPresidential Power: Striking
Down but Not Back, 93 MINN. L. REv. 1778 (2009).
32. Note, Impoundment ofFunds, 86 HARv. L. REv. 1505 (1973).
33. John H. Stassen, Separation of Powers and the Uncommon Defense:
The Case Against Impounding of Weapons System Appropriations, 57 GEO. L.J.
1159 (1969).
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Then came the most important ap ropriation-limiting
enactments: in the 1970s for the Vietnam War and in the 1980s
for the Contra conflict over the "Boland Amendments." 7 In the
1990s, further illumination about war-powers provisions occurred
34. Nile Stanton, History and Practice of Executive Impoundment of
Appropriated Funds, 53 NEB. L. REV. 1 (1974).
35. Kate Stith, Rewriting the Fiscal Constitution: The Case of Gramm-
Rudman-Hollings, 76 CAL L. REV. 593 (1988); Win. Bradford Middlekauff,
Note, Twisting the President's Arm: The Impoundment Control Act as a Tool for
Enforcing the Principle of Appropriation Expenditure, 100 YALE L.J. 209
(1990); Cathy S. Neuren, Note, Addressing the Resurgence of Presidential
Budgetmaking Initiative: A Proposal to Reform the Impoundment Control Act of
1974, 63 TEX. L. REV. 693 (1984).
36. John H. Ely, The American War in Indochina, Part I: The (Troubled)
Constitutionality of the War They Told Us About, 42 STAN. L. REV. 877 (1990)
[hereinafter Ely, The American War in Indochina, Part 1]; John H. Ely, The
American War in Indochina, Part II: The Unconstitutionality of the War They
Didn't Tell Us About, 42 STAN. L. REV. 1093 (1990).
37. HAROLD HONGJU KOH, THE NATIONAL SECURITY CONSTITUTION:
SHARING POWER AFTER THE IRAN-CONTRA AFFAIR (1990); G.H. Wolohojian,
Note, The Boland Amendments and Foreign Affairs Deference, 88 COLUM. L.
REV. 1534 (1988). Between Vietnam and Iran-Contra, war powers issues arose
in 1983 as to Lebanon. See CHARLES TIEFER, THE SEMI-SOVEREIGN
PRESIDENCY: THE BUSH ADMINISTRATION'S STRATEGY FOR GOVERNING
WITHOUT CONGRESS 123-24 (1994) [hereinafter TIEFER, THE SEMI-SOVEREIGN
PRESIDENCY] (Lebanon resolution with time limitation); Martin Wald, Note, The
Future of the War Powers Resolution, 36 STAN. L. REV. 1407 (1984). As
Solicitor of the House of Representatives in 1984-1995, the author represented
the House in constitutional cases on national security and was privileged enough
to see events like the conflict over the Boland Amendments. See, e.g., Am.
Foreign Serv. Ass'n v. Garfinkel, 490 U.S. 153 (1989) (vacating ruling striking
down as unconstitutional a classified information provision in an appropriation
bill). For a previous article discussing the role of congressional counsel, see
Charles Tiefer, The FAS Proposal: Valid Check or Unconstitutional Veto?, in
FIRST USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS UNDER THE CONSTITUTION, WHO DECIDES?
143 (Peter Raven-Hansen ed., 1987), reprinted in FRANCK ET AL., supra note 1,
at 728-32. As Special Deputy Chief Counsel on the House Iran-Contra
Committee, the author co-authored the chapter in the committee report on the
Boland Amendments. H.R. REP. No. 100-433, at 489-500 (1987). For a previous
discussion drawing on that service, see George W. Van Cleve & Charles Tiefer,
Navigating the Shoals of "Use" Immunity and Secret International Enterprises
in Major Congressional Investigations: Lessons of the Iran-Contra Affair, 55
Mo. L. REV. 43 (1990). The author filed the amicus brief for the House
Leadership Group in Garfinkel. Brief of the Speaker and Leadership Group of
the U.S. House of Representatives as Amicus Curiae, Garfinkel, 490 U.S. 153
(No. 87-2127). The brief addressed the constitutionality of the appropriation
rider in that case, while also arguing the mootness issue, which the Court
accepted. The issues were nicely treated in Michael Glennon, Publish and
Perish: Congress's Effort to Snip Snepp, Before and AFSA, 10 MICH. J. INT'L L.
163 (1989).
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during the course of the military interventions of the
administrations of President George H. W. Bush3 8 and of President
Bill Clinton,3 9 including President Clinton's intervention in the
1999 bombing campaign against Serbia. 40
Most recently, the Bush administration4 1  took extreme
positions42 on the executive's constitutional powers that shape the
contemporary discussion of war powers in the Obama
administration. These positions related to a range of war
contexts,43 such as the "global war on terror," commission
trials,4 5 detention and extreme treatment of terror suspects and
Iraqi war prisoners, 46 eavesdropping,47 and interpretation of the
38. TIEFER, THE SEMI-SOVEREIGN PRESIDENCY, supra note 37, at 119-36;
Lori Fisler Damrosch, The Clinton Administration and War Powers, 63 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 125 (2000).
39. For example, the Republican Congress of the 1990s disagreed with
President Clinton about whether American troops should serve under a U.N.
flag, producing a constitutional clash. Richard Hartzman, Congressional Control
of the Military in a Multilateral Context, 162 MIL. L. REV. 50 (1999); see Tiefer,
supra note 2, at 320-21.
40. Charles Tiefer, Adjustable Sovereignty: Contemporary Congressional-
Executive Controversies About International Organizations, 35 TEX. INT'L L.J.
239 (2000) (noting that the Kosovo and Serbia bombing campaign fits other
aspects of Congressional-executive controversies); Charles Tiefer, War
Decisions in the Late 1990s by Partial Congressional Declaration, 36 SAN
DIEGO L. REv. 1 (1999) [hereinafter Tiefer, War Decisions]; Michael Hahn,
Note, The Conflict in Kosovo: A Constitutional War?, 89 GEO. L.J. 2351 (2001).
For a survey of these 1990s provisions, see Michael D. Ramsey, Presidential
Declarations of War, 37 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 321 (2003). For a strong criticism
of presidential claims to war powers culminating in criticisms of both the Bush
and Clinton administration positions, see Louis Fisher, Unchecked Presidential
Wars, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 1637 (2000).
41. This Article uses "the Bush administration" to refer only to the
administration of President George W. Bush, and not that of his father, President
George H.W. Bush.
42. CHARLES TIEFER, VEERING RIGHT (2004).
43. David Gray Adler, George Bush and the Abuse of History: The
Constitution and Presidential Power in Foreign Affairs, 12 UCLA J. INT'L L. &
FOREIGN AFF. 75, 120-30 (2007).
44. See, e.g., Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Congressional
Authorization and the War on Terrorism, 118 HARV. L. REV. 2047 (2005). But
see David Abramowitz, The President, the Congress, and Use of Force: Legal
and Political Considerations in Authorizing Use of Force Against International
Terrorism, 43 HARV. INT'L L.J. 71 (2002) (discussing how actual compromise
on the September 14, 2001 resolution moderated presidential power).
45. Doran G. Arik, Note, The Tug of War: Combatant Status Review
Tribunals and the Struggle to Balance National Security and Constitutional
Values During the War on Terror, 16 J.L. & POL'Y 657 (2008).
46. See generally Diane Marie Amann, Abu Ghraib, 153 U. PA. L. REV.
2085(2005).
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authorization of force after 9/11 in Afghanistan and beyond.48 The
Bush administration also claimed enhanced power over asserted
congressional micromanaging and about the role of presidential
- * 49signing statements.
The Bush administration's expansive interpretations drew
many reactions. The Supreme Court delivered rebukes of the Bush
47. U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, LEGAL AuTHORITIEs SUPPORTING THE ACTIVITIES
OF THE NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY DESCRIBED BY THE PRESIDENT (2006),
available at http://www.justice.gov/opa/whitepaperonnsalegalauthorities.pdf;
Christopher M. Ford, Intelligence Demands in a Democratic State: Congressional
Intelligence Oversight, 81 TUL. L. REv. 721 (2007); Heidi Kitrosser,
Congressional Oversight of National Security Activities: Improving Information
Funnels, 29 CARDozo L. REv. 1049 (2008).
48. Professor Michael Van Alstine has noted: "The Bush Administration
has relied on claims of implied and inherent Article II authority for an assertion
of a broad array of powers, including those regarding the war in Iraq and the
detainment of alleged supporters of international terrorism." Michael P. Van
Alstine, Executive Aggrandizement in Foreign Affairs Lawmaking, 54 UCLA L.
REv. 309, 312 n.8 (2006). See also U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, supra note 47, at 1,
which Professor Van Alstine notes as "asserting that the [P]resident has
'inherent constitutional authority . . . to conduct warrantless surveillance for
intelligence purposes."' Van Alstine, supra, at 312 n.8. Also see Memorandum
from Jay S. Bybee, Assistant Attorney Gen., to Alberto R. Gonzales, Counsel to
the President, & William J. Haynes II, Gen. Counsel of the Dep't of Def. 11-15,
32-34 (Jan. 22, 2002), which Professor Van Alstine notes as "supporting the
presidential detention of alleged foreign terrorists on the basis that '[f]rom the
very beginnings of the Republic' the Vesting Clause of Article II 'has been
understood to grant the President plenary control over the conduct of foreign
relations."' Van Alstine, supra, at 312 n.8. Similarly, Professor Van Alstine
cites Memorandum from John Yoo, Deputy Assistant Attorney Gen., & Robert
J. Delahunty, Special Counsel, to William J. Haynes II, Gen. Counsel of the
Dep't of Def. 14-16 (Jan. 9, 2002), as "supporting detention and use of force
against alleged terrorists in the United States on the same grounds." Van Alstine,
supra, at 312 n.8. Additionally, see Curtis A. Bradley & Martin S. Flaherty,
Executive Power Essentialism and Foreign Affairs, 102 MICH. L. REv. 545, 548
(2004), which notes that "[i]n recent years" the implied executive powers
argument "has gained newfound popularity" among the Bush Administration
and its supporters.
49. See, e.g., Sofia E. Biller, Note, Flooded by the Lowest Ebb:
Congressional Responses to Presidential Signing Statements and Executive
Hostility to the Operation of Checks and Balances, 93 IowA L. REv. 1067
(2008); Note, Context-Sensitive Deference to Presidential Signing Statements,
120 HARV. L. REv. 597 (2006); Malinda Lee, Comment, Reorienting the Debate
on Presidential Signing Statements: The Need for Transparency in the
President's Constitutional Objections, Reservations, and Assertions of Power,
55 UCLA L. REv. 705 (2008).
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administration in the major cases of Hamdan v. Rumsfeld,5 0 Rasul
v. Bush, ' and Boumediene v. Bush.52 Congress passed provisions
like the McCain Amendment (the "Detainee Treatment Act"),
which prohibited extreme treatment of detainees. 53 President
Obama reacted against his predecessor's assertions of power, to a
54
measured extent, by a promise to rein in signing statements.
Part III of this Article uses the just-summarized constitutional
history to set up and to apply a basic structure to categorize
congressional appropriation riders. Although the main focus is to
contextualize provisions for stepping up a war, the approach also
yields insight regarding all war-related appropriation riders. In
light of history, whether provisions are presumptively
unconstitutional depends on whether the provision goes to the very
core of the Commander in Chief's more "central" concerns in the
war zone:5 7 command,s6  disposition of forces, and military
campaigns.
50. 548 U.S. 577 (2006); see Gordon G. Young, Youngstown, Hamdan, and
"Inherent" Emergency Presidential Policymaking Powers, 66 Mo. L. REV. 787
(2007).
51. 542 U.S. 466 (2004); see Ari Aranda, The Supreme Court's Post-9/11
War-on-Terror Jurisprudence: Special Considerations, Threshold
Determinations, and Anticipatory Review, 73 BROOK. L. REV. 645 (2008).
52. 553 U.S. 723 (2008); see Christina Duffy Burnett, A Convenient
Constitution? Extraterritoriality After Boumediene, 109 COLUM. L. REv. 973
(2009); Case Comment, Extraterritorial Reach of Writ of Habeas Corpus, 122
HARV. L. REv. 395 (2008).
53. Detainee Treatment Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-148, § 801, 119 Stat.
2739, 2744; see Harold Hongju Koh, Can the President Be Torturer in Chief?,
81 IND. L.J. 1145 (2006).
54. Neal Devins, The More Things Change, the More They Stay the Same,
12 GREEN BAG 137, 142-43 (2009).
55. For a different way of evaluating the extent of infringement of a
provision on the Commander in Chief concerns, see Tiefer, supra note 2, at
320-25.
56. Training of British Flying Students in the U.S., 40 Op. Att'y Gen. 58,
61-62 (1941) ("[T]he President's responsibility as Commander in Chief
embraces the authority to command and direct the armed forces in their
immediate movements and operations ... ."). In an apt distinction:
[Congress] also has a distinct enumerated power to provide for armies
and navies, and to prescribe the uses to be made for them. There is
nothing inconsistent between this proposition and another one, which
arises from a combined reading of the declaration of war clause and the
President's power as Commander in Chief. This is the proposition that
under those circumstances in which Congress has affirmatively
embraced a commitment to belligerent activities overseas on a
sustained basis, it may not presume to dictate the minute strategy and
tactics of the President's conduct of the authorized enterprise.
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A different category of provisions do collide with those
"central" concerns, but not at the core and only to the extent of
infringing those concerns at their periphery.5 8 Finally, the last type
involves "shared" (rather than President-"central") provisions:
issues as to which Congress does not go squarely against those
specifically Commander in Chief-centered issues. For these,
Congress may have express Article I grants of powers or a full
history of legislative action. This approach parallels the "three
zone" classification used by the key opinion in Youngstown Sheet
& Tube Co. v. Sawyer.59
Part IV proceeds to apply the analysis to three hypothetical
measures, one in each of these categories that Congress might
enact years from now in the Afghan conflict. First, Congress may
enact a provision that directs the President to make an armed
incursion into "border sanctuaries" within Pakistan.6 o Such
congressional action would collide with the core of the
Commander in Chief s central issue of campaigning.6
The next Section of Part IV studies a congressional mechanism
for intrusively overseeing command-a special oversight
committee. This Section delves into the under-appreciated history
of congressional wartime inquiries. It compares the infamous joint
committee that oversaw the conduct of the Civil War with the
Charles Bennett et al., The President's Powers as Commander-in-Chief Versus
Congress' War Power and Appropriations Power, 43 U. MIAMI L. REV. 17, 46-
47 (1988) (statement of Professor William Van Alstine).
57. See 27 Op. Att'y Gen. 259, 260 (1909) (upholding as constitutional a
Congressional provision mandating that 8% of detachments aboard naval vessels
consist of marines).
58. Lobel, supra note 4.
59. 343 U.S. 579, 635-38 (1952). For recent treatments of the Bush
administration's initiatives in light of Youngstown, see, for example, Joseph C.
Hansen, Murder and the Military Commissions: Prohibiting the Executive's
Unauthorized Expansion of Jurisdiction, 93 MINN. L. REv. 1871 (2009); Mark
D. Rosen, Revisiting Youngstown: Against the View That Jackson's
Concurrence Resolves the Relation Between Congress and the Commander-in-
Chief, 54 UCLA L. REv. 1703 (2007); Kathryn L. Einspanier, Note,
Burlamaqui, the Constitution, and the Imperfect War on Terror, 96 GEO. L.J.
985 (2008).
60. See Ingrid Brunk Wuerth, International Law and Constitutional
Interpretation: The Commander in Chief Clause Reconsidered, 106 MICH. L.
REv. 61 (2007).
61. This is one of those issues of the Commander in Chief power in which
international law overlaps with constitutional interpretation. See id.
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praiseworthy major oversight inquiry at the start of the Korean
War.62
The third Section of Part IV analyzes a hypothetical provision
as to "shared" issues of Congress and the President,63 in contrast to
the prior examples that affect the "central" Commander in Chief
issues." Namely, this Part considers a congressional provision
mandating a poppy eradication program. Also, this Part reviews
the complex history of military impoundments.65
Part V, this Article's conclusion, discusses how consideration
of the issues surrounding "more hawkish" congressional action
shakes up habitual ways of thinking. This approach invites
observers to rethink their settled presumptions. The unspoken
assumption has been that a strong Commander in Chief power
invariably drives an unwelcome expansion of war. To think
otherwise opens new frontiers for study of the war power.
A republic decays into an empire when its people no longer
rule in wartime. Yet, the conduct of national combat requires unity
of command. Will the constitutional law of war powers harmonize
these seemingly irreconcilable principles, not only when the
legislature wishes to restrain the executive, but when it seeks to
step up the war?
II. CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY
To treat the relevant constitutional history about Congress,
appropriations, and war powers, this Part divides it into three
sections: original intent (going back to English and colonial
precedents); the period up to 1945; and since 1945. Most of the
instances concern interactions in which Congress limited or
restricted war, with few having to do with Congress stepping up a
war. From the limitation provision examples, the author derives a
sense of what Congress does that collides with Commander in
Chief central issues at their core, Commander in Chief central
62. BRUCE TAP, OVER LINCOLN's SHOULDER: THE COMMITTEE ON THE
CONDUCT OF THE WAR (1998).
63. See, e.g., J. Andrew Kent, Congress's Under-Appreciated Power to
Define and Punish Offenses Against the Law of Nations, 85 TEX. L. REv. 843
(2007).
64. For example, in the mid-1990s, the Republican Congress did move a
number of measures that raised such issues. James P. Terry, The President as
Commander in Chief, 7 AVE MARIA L. REv. 391, 417 (2009) (not enforcing an
arms embargo against Bosnian Muslims).
65. Roy E. Brownell, II, The Constitutional Status of the President's
Impoundment of National Security Funds, 12 SEToN HALL CONST. L.J. 1 (2001)
(the leading work on military impoundment).
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issues at their periphery, or shared issues between Congress and
the President.
A. Original Intent
Of all the Constitution's clauses, the one with the greatest
importance for appropriation provisions, from its text and history,
is the "No Appropriations" clause: Article I, Section 9, Clause 7
provides that "No Money shall be drawn from the Treasury, but in
Consequence of Appropriations made by Law." 66 The Framers
placed this clause with, and worded it sternly like, the other
emphatic interdicts in Article I, Section 9, rather than with the
general affirmative powers in Article I, Section 10. From the "No
Appropriations" clause, Congress derives the great power to attach
conditions to funding, such as attaching to military appropriations
during the Indochina War in the 1970s that "none of the funds shall
be used" for ground operations across the borders in Laos and
Cambodia.67
1. British Antecedents
In terms of original intent, the wording of the constitutional
text for Congress's spending power provisions, against the
background of English and colonial traditions, vests the power of
the purse in the legislature for specific reasons. Spending control
aimed to keep power over the initiation of war in the people's
representative bodies. Parliament moved in that direction in the
Tudor and early Stuart years68 and in steps leading up to the
English Civil War.69 Parliament established that the Crown must
accept the conditions accompanying the revenues to initiate wars.70
66. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 7; see Office of Pers. Mgmt. v. Richmond,
496 U.S. 414 (1990).
67. FISHER, supra note 1, at 142-43.
68. The historic conflict in England between the Stuart monarchs and the
House of Commons led to these clauses, which specifically established the
legislative power to dictate the terms and conditions for spending revenue upon
shaping the initiation of war. Gerhard Casper, Appropriations of Power, 13 U.
ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REv. 1, 3-5 (1990).
69. Meanwhile, the same era laid the foundation for the modest original
intent of the Commander in Chief clause. In 1641, Parliament had brought on
the English Civil War by conferring control of the standing army on the Earl of
Essex, who was under Parliament's authority, rather than leaving it with Charles
I. Francis L. Coolidge, Jr. & Joel David Sharrow, Note, The War-Making
Powers: The Intentions of the Framers in the Light ofParliamentary History, 50
B.U. L. REv. (SPECIAL IssuE) 5, 9 (1970).
70. Casper, supra note 68, at 3-5.
2011]1 403
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
After the Restoration, Parliament did let the King gain back the
right of command 7 1-prefiguring the Commander in Chief clause.
However, the King did so within the constraints of conditions on
funding war. Soon thereafter, the English Bill of Rights of 1689
memorialized the Commons' victory and anticipated the United
States Constitution.7 4 The 1689 measure provided, "[T]he raising
or keeping a standing army within the kingdome in time of peace
unlesse it be with consent of parlyament, is against law."75
More significantly for this Article, the English Bill of Rights of
1689 worded its power of the military purse in a way that
prefigured the "No Appropriations" clause. The English charter
said that "levying money for or to the use of the Crowne by
pretence of prerogative without grant of Parlyament for longer
time or in other manner then the same is or shall be granted is
illegal." 76 This language speaks potently about the origins of the
Constitution's "No Appropriations" clause. The language realized
a strong desire for means, through temporal limitation, to restrain
the executive. First, of course, it speaks in the negative-taking
unauthorized funding is illegal-but not spending authorized
funding falls under other provisions, which may not pack the same
wallop.
Second, though, the 1689 language carries a special message
besides its operation in the negative. Strikingly, the clause's
asymmetric drafting obliges the Crown to submit to Parliament as
to funding wars "for longr time," although that drafting expressly
chooses not to make the Crown submit to Parliament as to warring
"for shorter time." 77 The House of Commons made express its fear
of the Crown warring after the waning of the Commons' support-
71. Id.
72. Parliament maintained its purse control over troop deployments, for
example, requiring by a 1678 act that the funds granted be used to disband the
forces stationed in Flanders. GLENNON, supra note 1, at 287.
73. The expulsion of James II in favor of William III in the Glorious
Revolution established that Parliament, not the King, would decide where, and
on what terms, to unleash military force. Casper, supra note 68.
74. The United States Constitution has parallel provisions on raising armies
derived from the English Bill of Rights of 1689, factoring in colonial experience
that revived and newly intensified the issues of Tudor and Stuart times in
England. Bernard Donohue & Marshall Smelser, The Congressional Power to
Raise Armies: The Constitutional and Ratifying Conventions, 1787-1788, 33
REv. POL. 202 (1971).
75. Coolidge & Sharrow, supra note 69, at 9 (quoting Bill of Rights, I W.
& M., sess. 2, c. 2 (1689) (U.K.)).
76. Id at 8 (emphasis added) (quoting Bill of Rights, 1 W. & M., sess. 2, c. 2).
77. Id.
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"for longr time."78 The Commons had no corresponding concern
about the Crown warring too briefly or too frugally for the
Commons' taste.
That wording implements a great historic lesson in the rise of
Anglo-American democracy. It did not arise from any desire for
Parliament itself to produce temporal expansion of the war toward
a "longr time." That is, it did not arise for Parliament to prevent the
executive from a moderate, "non-hawkish" conduct of war. It
might be called the "ceiling" or "downward ratchet" message of
the "No Appropriations" clause: the Commons may command that
the King not take wars up above a ceiling, but he can conduct wars
of shorter duration or less intensely, and they cannot prevent him
from going in that direction.
2. Constitutional Text
An influential study of the Constitution's war provisions
identifies the universal fear of executive excess warring to gain
glory. With that suspicion went a corresponding trust of the
popularly based legislature to restrain the executive's trip down
glory road-without any such concern for some need to goad the79
executive into more warring.
One could describe Parliament, and the population it
represented, as having a case of what has been termed for 40 years
now as the "Vietnam War syndrome." That is, an unhappy and
oppressive experience with a King's or President's taste for
making, continuing, and escalating war motivated each generation
of legislators. The British Parliament of the 1600s and the
Constitutional Convention of 1789 corresponded to what occurred
after Vietnam in the United States Congress in the 1970s, namely,
each time the legislators spoke for a population mortally skeptical
and critical about the executive's taste for more war.80
The asymmetrically drafted English Bill of Rights had similar
roots with the purely negative "No Appropriations" clause and the
reform war-restraining legislation of the 1970s-both of which had
the English Bill of Rights as their antecedent. Each of these
strengthened the power of the legislature, by appropriation limits,
to restrain the executive's war making. Yet none of them gave any
78. Id.
79. William Michael Treanor, Fame, the Founding, and the Power to
Declare War, 82 CORNELL L. REv. 695 (1997).
80. The legislatures and charter writers of the 1600s, 1789, and the 1970s,
and the populations they spoke for, in no way coupled their extreme skepticism
of war stepped up by executives with any intense desire that their legislatures
ratchet up wars over the reluctance of executives.
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precedent for a legislature stepping up a war. Colonial
governments similarly used riders on war-funding legislation to
control their governors 8 '-not to step up wars.
Textually, and as a matter of original intent, Article I spells out
Congress's appropriations power far more powerfully than most of
Congress's other powers. The "Raise and Support Clause"
provides "That the Congress shall have Power . . . To raise and
support Armies, but no Appropriation of Money to that Use shall
be for a longer Term than two Years." 82 Article I confers upon the
Congress the power to "declare War."83 Article I provides a
number of other specific grants of authority regarding war and the
military. These range from the clause empowering Congress to
make "Rules" and "Regulation[s]"84 for the militar to Congress
"organizing, arming, and disciplining, the Militia," today's state
national guards.
On the other hand, Article II, Section 2, Clause 1, provides that
"The President shall be Commander in Chief of the Army and
Navy of the United States." 86 And, Article II, Section 1, Clause 1,
begins, "The executive Power shall be vested in a President of the
United States of America."87
Because in England the monarchy at least had the power to
declare war (albeit potentially subject to purse-string control), and
under the Constitution only the Congress would have that power,
Alexander Hamilton, in The Federalist, gave a famous explanation
of the limited authority of the Commander in Chief.88 The Framers
had a modest view of the Commander in Chief clause.89 Even the
81. BANKS & RAVEN-HANSEN, supra note 1, at 18-26.
82. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 12.
83. Id. cl. 11.
84. Id. cl. 14.
85. Id. cl. 16.
86. Id. art. II, § 2, cl. 1.
87. Id. § 1, cl. 1.
88. Hamilton remarked:
The president is to be commander in chief of the army and navy of the
United States. In this respect his authority would be nominally the same
with that of the king of Great Britain, but in substance much inferior to
it. It would amount to nothing more than the supreme command and
direction of the military and naval forces, as first general and admiral of
the confederacy; while that of the British king extends to the declaring
of war and to the raising and regulating of fleets and armies, all which;
by the constitution under consideration, would appertain to the
legislature.
THE FEDERALIST No. 69, at 357 (Alexander Hamilton) (George W. Carey &
James McClellan eds., 2001).
89. At most, the Framers may have intended the Commander in Chief
clause merely to avoid a repetition of the Continental Congress's excesses in
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executive-minded Hamilton stressed Congress's powers would
include "the raising and regulating of fleets and armies,"90 which
bespeaks how much the Framers meant for these provisions to
have real significance for imposing controls on war. Nothing could
have been further from the Framers' minds than for the powers
created under these provisions to expand or to extend making war.
Moreover, Congressional purse-string power over the scope of
military action91 became a crucial justification of the Constitution
during the ratification debates. 92 The anti-federalists complained
bitterly that the national government could raise a standing army
(especially with no limit on its size set in the Constitution) and also
going beyond mere close oversight of military efforts during the Revolutionary
War and certain intrigues against George Washington's role as supreme
commanding general. These intrigues ranged from establishing a Board of
Review for the military and murmurings against Washington when the war was
not going well, to rather extreme attempts by intriguers like General Horatio
Gates to divide up command. JACK N. RAKOVE, THE BEGINNINGS OF NATIONAL
POLITICS: AN INTERPRETIVE HISTORY OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS 121
(1979) (murmurings, Gates); id. at 196, 201, 203 (Board of War). Presidential
proponents sometimes suggest that the Constitution intended to expand the
President's power because of discontent with over-interference by the
Continental Congress. Historians do not support this view. Moreover, there is
virtually nothing in either the Federalist Papers or the ratification debates to
support any notion of a desire for a powerful Commander in Chief freed of
purse-string control by Congress. In the eyes of the Constitutional Convention,
the problem was that the national government needed more power to raise funds
and have a national military. For this, it was essential that the public be
reassured that control of the purse strings would vest in the accountable
Congress. Had the draft Constitution exalted the much less accountable
President, who might turn out to have too much taste for war, it would have
turned off public support on this issue.
90. THE FEDERALIST No. 69, at 357.
91. In other contexts, executive supporters have argued that the
Constitutional Convention reacted against the unrestrained state legislatures of
the 1780s and took steps intended to curb Congress's powers. However, in this
context, there seems no sign that the Convention had a mind to vest power in the
President to supersede provisions limiting war spending. On the contrary, the
specific language about spending no money from the treasury, except in
consequence of appropriations made by law, came as a series of states put
similar clauses in their own constitutions. And, the states did so because "at the
same time states enhanced executive authority, they reinforced their legislatures'
hold on the state fisc, principally by proscribing the expenditure of funds except
as directed by legislative enactment." Richard D. Rosen, Funding "Non-
Traditional " Military Operations: The Alluring Myth of a Presidential Power of
the Purse, 155 MIL. L. REV. 1, 63 (1998). For a discussion of the period from the
American Revolution to the Constitution, see Casper, supra note 68, at 6-8.
92. JACK N. RAKOvE, ORIGINAL MEANINGS: POLITICS AND IDEAS IN THE
MAKING OF THE CONSTITUTION (1996).
2011] 407
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
that the national government held too much power over the state
militias.9 3 In an answer that won ratification for the Constitution,
its defenders stressed heavily the division of national authority.
This gave effective control to the Congress, not to the President, so
standing armies and control of the militia could not produce
excesses of monarchical or dictatorial power. 94
As Thomas Jefferson memorably wrote in commenting on the
Constitutional Convention's work, "we have already given . .. one
effectual check to the Dog of war by transferring the power of
letting him loose from the Executive to the Legislative body, from
those who are to spend to those who are to pay."9 s Using the
prevalent idiom, Jefferson spoke of the President submitting to the
Congress about letting loose "the Dog of War," not of Congress
goading some cautious or prudent President to step up his wars.
Accordingly, the relatively limited central issues of the
Commander in Chief clause came to three.96 Two were command
and campaigns. Hamilton said in The Federalist that the
President's authority as Commander in Chief "would amount to
nothing more than the supreme command and direction of the
military and naval forces, as first general and admiral of the
confederacy."97 Then, in 1895 the Supreme Court said that the
clause "vest[s] in the President the supreme command over all the
military forces-such supreme and undivided command as would
be necessary to the prosecution of a successful war."9 Both these
statements concerned the President's power to command.
The Supreme Court stated as to command and campaigning:
Congress has the power not only to raise and support and
govern armies but to declare war. It has, therefore, the
power to provide by law for carrying on war. This power
necessarily extends to all legislation essential to the
93. MAX M. EDLING, A REVOLUTION IN FAVOR OF GOVERNMENT: ORIGINS
OF THE U.S. CONSTITUTION AND THE MAKING OF THE AMERICAN STATE 89-100
(2003).
94. Peter Raven-Hansen & William C. Banks, Pulling the Purse Strings of
the Commander-in-Chief, 80 VA. L. REV. 833, 895-96 (1994).
95. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison (Sept. 6, 1789), in 15
THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 392, 397 (Julian P. Boyd ed., 1958).
96. The tension occurs between, on the one hand, "forces placed by law at
his command," and, then, Congressional acts limiting war. Plainly, the Framers
put their trust in Congress's using the power of the purse to limit the scope of
war, without considering this an intrusion into actual command. Rosen, supra
note 91, at 72-74.
97. THE FEDERALIST NO. 69, at 357 (Alexander Hamilton) (George W.
Carey & James McClellan eds., 2001).
98. United States v. Sweeny, 157 U.S. 281, 284 (1895).
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prosecution of war with vigor and success, except such as
interferes with the command of the forces and the conduct
of campaigns. That power and duty belong to the President
as commander-in-chief99
Also, the Supreme Court said in 1850: "As commander-in-
chief, [the President] is authorized to direct the movements of the
naval and military forces placed by law at his command, and to
employ them in the manner he may deem most effectual to harass
and conquer and subdue the enemy."100 To "employ them" in order
"to harass and conquer and subdue" amounts to the President's
direction of campaigning.101
The third Commander in Chief power is disposition of forces.
The Court commented: "As commander-in-chief, he is authorized
to direct the movements of the naval and military forces placed by
law at his command, and to employ them in the manner he may
deem most effectual to harass and conquer and subdue the
enemy."l02 The President's power to direct the movement of
military force encompasses controlling their location in wartime
and, to some extent, in peacetime. This presidential capability to
base an air force in Uzbekistan across the border from the
Afghanistan War, or, to some extent, to create new major national
commitments by basing forces in the expanded NATO, shows the
potency of the power of disposition of forces.
In these and other terse yet informative descriptions, the
Supreme Court sets forth the central components of the
Commander in Chief power in a war zone: command, disposition
of forces, and campaigning.
B. To the Present
1. Up to 1945
The first century after the Constitution's ratification furnishes
some examples of Congress using, or threatening to use, its power
to put terms on military wartime appropriations, 03 usually to
99. Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2, 139 (1866) (emphasis added).
100. Fleming v. Page, 50 U.S. (9 How.) 603, 615 (1850).
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Colonel Rosen makes a useful comparison, as he researched the history,
between the congressional power in the 1790s and the congressional power two
centuries later: "The position taken by the House of Representatives in April
1796 [about not being obliged to fund the Jay Treaty] has prevailed. This is
exemplified today by Congress' continuing refusal to appropriate the money
needed to satisfy dues assessed against the United States under the United
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restrain the more forceful Presidents.104 It is worth remembering
how often during the 1800s a "hawkish" Congress pushed the
President into war. Congress pushed President Madison into the
War of 1812, and a similar Congress pushed President McKinley
into the Spanish-American War. Although Congress had not
convened when President Lincoln dealt with the onset of the Civil
War, once it did convene, it showed great vigor in wanting to fight
the war, including, sometimes, more of a taste for "hawkish"
measures than Lincoln.
Various nuances of Congress's power to push in "hawkish"
directions come out in the undeclared limited naval war with
France (sometimes called the "Quasi-War") starting in 1798. os
Commentators have traced how ways to step up that very limited
naval war-for example, commencing to arm merchant ships or to
make offensive reprisals-required action by Congress, not the
President.106 But, Congress was not using appropriation riders to
push President Adams to rev up the war. Congress simply
increased the authorized activity beyond what it had enacted
earlier. President Adams and President Madison, as to the War of
1812, are both considered as less "hawkish" than their
Congresses. o0 In later wars, such as the Mexican War, os Congress
Nations Charter, although the United States is bound by treaty to pay the dues."
Rosen, supra note 91, at 128 (footnote omitted).
104. For some miscellaneous examples, see HENKIN, supra note 1, at 389-90
n.6 1.
105. A complex pattern emerges from that "Quasi-War" with France in the
1790s. This produced several key Supreme Court opinions about Congress
limiting the President's power to conduct hostilities. Lobel, supra note 4, at
423-30. Congress decided on limited war, and determined what those limits
would be, and the Supreme Court confirmed Congress's action.
106. Lobel, supra note 20, at 1065-69. For more about the Quasi-War, see
Michael P. Kelly, Fixing the War Powers, 141 ML. L. REV. 83, 138-39 (1993).
107. Sidak, supra note 8.
108. The House twice passed a condition on an appropriation, well known as
the "Wilmot Proviso," to bar slavery in territory to be acquired from Mexico.
Kristian D. Whitten, The Fourteenth Amendment: Justice Bradley's Twentieth
Century Legacy, 29 CUMB. L. REV. 143, 148 (1999). Although the final
appropriation law omitted the proviso, the House passage of that proviso
signaled that the free states would block slavery in the territories, while slave
states were losing control of Congress. The proviso, and other House
pronouncements about the Mexican War, are seen as starting the slave states
toward doubting their future in Congress. HENKIN, supra note 1, at 381 n.33.
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laid down markers about its setting policy for war zones that
endure today as legislative high-water marks. 09
Then, the Civil War itself greatly demonstrated Congress's
power to set policy in the war zone by legislation or by
appropriation riders. 10 Notably, Professor Lobel studied the
enactment of the Second Confiscation Act, an enactment of high
significance and the forerunner of the Emancipation
Proclamation."' Congress legislated that the military would
confiscate the property and free the slaves of rebels.112 The statute
expressed Congress's desire without delay to push further in
freeing slaves. It thereby embittered the South and even potentially
alienated the border states. President Lincoln opposed what he
considered the ill timing of the measure. 113
One of the most important debates on Congress stepping up
war zone action against presidential opposition occurred on this
bill."' The debate distinguished between, on the one hand,
Congress's ample power to make highly important policy in the
war zone and, on the other hand, Congress's hesitancy to interfere
with the President's command of battlefield campaigning.
President Lincoln signed the final bill.
After the Civil War, by the use of riders on military
appropriations, congressional influence predominated in
Reconstruction through the directions given by such riders to the
occupation armies that controlled the southern states. Even after
109. The provisions ultimately, just over a dozen years later, led the southern
states to their choice of secession. G. Randal Hornaday, Note, The Forgotten
Empire: Pre-Civil War Southern Imperialism, 36 CONN. L. REv. 225 (2003).
110. "The great volume of legislation required by the rebellion made this
period prolific in riders." Alexander Johnston, Riders, in 3 CYCLOPAEDIA OF
POLITICAL SCIENCE, POLITICAL ECONOMY, AND OF THE POLITICAL HISTORY OF
THE UNITED STATES (John Joseph Lalor ed., 1899), available at http://oll.
libertyfund.org/title/971/63566.
111. Lobel, supra note 4, at 431.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 437.
114. Id. at 433-36.
115. Johnston, supra note 110, goes through the whole period, rider by rider.
The tone was set during the military occupation of the South immediately after
the Civil War. It took the form of a full-scale clash between Congress and the
President, with the Republican Congress setting policy through riders. The
impeachment of President Andrew Johnson occurred for breaching the Tenure
of Office Act, which limited the President's power to remove those under him in
the chain of command. When President Johnson challenged this, Congress
impeached him, and he barely escaped conviction by one vote. Although long
afterward the Supreme Court made clear that the Tenure of Office Act had been
unconstitutional, Johnson's impeachment sealed Congress's supremacy for years
thereafter. Johnston recites a fascinating account of how, from 1876 on, the
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the end of Reconstruction, Congress still had the uper hand
effectively at least until the early twentieth century. President
McKinley, as to the Spanish-American War, was another President
considered less "hawkish" than his Congress.'" 7 In that era,
Congress, not the President, decided on war issues.
During President Theodore Roosevelt's administration,
Congress and the President wrestled for control of the expanded
navy required by the country's larger global role after the Spanish-
American War. In one notable instance, Roosevelt's attorney
general conceded the constitutionality of one controversial
appropriation condition."' 8 He opined sweepingly that "Congress is
the sole judge of how the Army or Navy shall be raised and of
what it shall be composed" and that Congress could condition
validly "that such appropriation [for the marines] shall not be
available unless the marine corps be employed in some designated
[by Congress] way."' '9 Still, this was not wartime.
Congress enacted one of the key war-related conditions of the
twentieth century in 1940.120 President Franklin Roosevelt had
staked his ability to act, at a time when public opinion largely
wished to avoid involvement in the European war, on a distinction
between steps he would take for preparedness and on military
intervention overseas he pledged to avoid. Roosevelt succeeded in
getting the nation's first peacetime draft through Congress by the
bare margin of a single vote in the House.' 2 1 However, Roosevelt
did so only by accepting a famous condition that no draftees be
stationed outside of the Western Hemisphere or the territories and
fierce struggle over various riders for the army appropriation bills marked the
end of Reconstruction. Briefer allusions to this occur in HENKIN, supra note 1, at
380 n.29, and Michael J. Gerhardt, Ackermania: The Quest for a Common Law
ofHigher Lawmaking, 40 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1731, 1763 (1999).
116. Until President Theodore Roosevelt, Congress, also using the Senate's
so-called treaty veto as well as congressional control of appropriations, set the
bounds in military and overseas affairs. See generally Eli M. Nobleman,
Financial Aspects of Congressional Participation in Foreign Relations, 289
ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & Soc. SC. 145 (1951).
117. Sidak, supra note 8, at 86.
118. Congress conditioned appropriations on including marines in
detachments aboard naval vessels. 27 Op. Att'y Gen. 259 (1909).
119. Id. at 260.
120. This particular condition was not an appropriation rider, but, rather, was
upon the authorizing legislation for the draft. Technically, it could be dismissed
for that reason as irrelevant to analysis of appropriation riders. History, however,
singled out this momentous legislation to serve as the vehicle for a condition
restraining the President from making a controversial use of his draftees. It is an
illuminating precedent regardless of its not being an appropriation bill.
121. Tiefer, supra note 2, at 303 & n.98.
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possessions of the United States.122 Roosevelt's acceptance of the
condition deferred to Congress in its setting the limits on the use of
the military.123 Although Congress left disposition of forces in
wartime to the Commander in Chief, disposition of forces in
peacetime belonged to Congress. 24
2. Cold War and After
During the Cold War that followed World War II, Presidents
Truman, Eisenhower, Kennedy, and Johnson demonstrated to a
greater or lesser extent that they would take the military machine
raised and funded by Congress and make their own unilateral
decisions on commitments abroad and on use of force.125 Although
Congressional influence diminished vis-A-vis the President,
Congress still had a substantial role in military affairs-over
military spending in general, and spending on overseas forces and
foreign military aid in particular.' 2 Congressional provisions as to
foreign military aid had great significance.' 27 By a system of
122. Selective Service and Training Act of 1940, ch. 720, § 3(e), 54 Stat.
885, 886.
123. Charles J. Cooper, After the Imperial Presidency, 47 MD. L. REv. 84, 97
n.44 (1987). Former Assistant Attorney General Cooper, in a historically learned
essay, notes that President Roosevelt sent troops to Greenland and Iceland
despite the latter being outside the Western Hemisphere. Id. This was indeed a
violation of the letter of the condition, but was not seen at the time as a serious
violation of its spirit, as the Iceland occupation kept near the balance of
defensive preparations rather than interventionist action. See generally Tiefer,
supra note 2, at 303 (describing the politics surrounding the provision).
124. That is, in peacetime the President could move his forces, such as from
domestic to foreign bases, without an express congressional decision to do so.
However, Congress itself might enact appropriation riders (or other legislation)
about such movement of troops, which, despite protest from the President, had a
fair chance of getting implemented.
125. The Korean War, the Cuban Missile Crisis, and the commitments that
evolved into the Vietnam War were primarily presidential rather than
congressional decisions. Congress did not effectively curb presidential war
initiation by resort to any of its powers, including appropriations conditions,
until the 1970s.
126. For discussions of the significance of military aid, see, for example,
Elizabeth Powers, Greed, Guns and Grist: US. Military Assistance and Arms
Transfers to Developing Countries, 84 N.D. L. REv. 383 (2008); Stephen J.
Wiese, Note, US. Foreign Aid Reform: Changing Institutional Problems in
Order to Meet Modern Day Needs, 8 WASH. U. GLOB. STUD. L. REV. 747
(2009).
127. To take one example on a prominent issue, Congress attached
provisions against settlements in the West Bank to authorizations of military aid
(cash or loan guarantees) to Israel, and disputes brought suspensions of
substantial aid. Zaha Hassan, Building Walls and Burning Bridges: Legal
Obligations of the United States with Respect to Israel's Construction of the
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annual defense authorizations drafted by Congress's armed
services committees, Congress arranged for an added measure of
oversight over military affairs.' 2 8 The extreme presidential asserted
power to impound military spending did manifest itself
occasionally, but so rarely as not to be convincing as to the
existence of a continuing substantial power. During this time,
President Truman, as to the Korean War, was yet another President
considered less "hawkish" at times than powerful elements in his
Congresses. 2 9
After about 30 years of this system of largely executive
control, and following on the exceptionally controversial later
years of the Vietnam War, a congressional backlash started against
the "Imperial Presidency."' 30 Congress demonstrated power to
restrain executive-initiated war in many respects, starting with cut-
offs of funding for the Indochina conflict,13 and including the War
Powers Resolution 132 and curbing of so-called war-making
treaties.133 In the 1980s, the Boland Amendments and the ensuing
Iran-Contra scandal dramatically demonstrated both Congress's
capacity to limit the President by appropriation conditions and the
folly of the President seeking to evade those limits.134
Wall of Separation in Occupied Palestinian Territory, 13 WILLAMETTE J. INT'L
L. & DisP. RESOL. 197, 235-36 (2005).
128. BANKS & RAVEN-HANSEN, supra note 1, at 48; BARRY M. BLECHMAN,
THE POLITICS OF NATIONAL SECURITY: CONGRESS AND U.S. DEFENSE POLICY
30-31 (1990); Louis Fisher, Annual Authorizations: Durable Roadblocks to
Biennial Budgeting, PUB. BUDGETING & FIN., Mar. 1983, at 23.
129. These were the elements sympathetic to General Douglas MacArthur's
strategy. See infra Part IV.B.2 (discussing the congressional committee that
reviewed the issues).
130. ARTHUR SCHLESINGER, THE IMPERIAL PRESIDENCY (1974).
131. The references to "Vietnam War" and "Indochina conflict" in this
Article refer to the same war, with slight nuances as to the geography involved.
132. GLENNON, supra note 1, at 87-122.
133. Id. at 192-228.
134. Sharp policy disputes often got resolved by votes on appropriation
riders. For example, the next area for potential covert armed intervention abroad
after the fall of Vietnam turned out to be Angola. Congress enacted the Clark
Amendment-a condition on appropriations-to preclude such intervention in
Angola. International Security Assistance and Arms Export Control Act of 1976,
Pub. L. No. 94-329, § 404, 90 Stat. 729, 757-58, amended by International
Security and Development Cooperation Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-533, §
118(a)-(d), 94 Stat. 3131, 3141. For a detailed account of the provision's
passage, particularly its roots in the Ford administration's diminished credibility
about such interventions, see THOMAS M. FRANCK & EDWARD WEISBAND,
FOREIGN POLICY BY CONGRESS 51-55 (1979).
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At the start of the 1990s, President George H.W. Bush
expressed impressive adherence to constitutional balance.' 3 5
Namely, President Bush did not seek to start the Gulf War just by
assertions of a Commander in Chief power, but rather sought
straightforwardly from Congress, and (just barely) obtained from
it, Congress's own authorization for the war.1  However, the
senior Bush did continue and expand President Reagan's use of a
hitherto insignificant gesture, the "signing statement."' 3 7 President
Bush used this extensively for sparring with Congress. Among
other types of provisions, he used signing statements to oppose
defense-spending provisions that "might be construed to impinge
on the President's authority as Commander in Chief and as the
head of the executive branch."l 38
The Republican Congress in 1994-2000 took some
illuminating actions. It waged a struggle against the President's
placement of troops under a United Nations (U.N.) flag.139 In that
respect, President Clinton might be considered less "hawkish" on
some issues than his Congress. In 1999, the Congressional debate
on whether to authorize President Clinton's air campaign against
Yugoslavia included consideration of an important limitation on
campaigning by barring the use of ground forces.140
Ultimately, in the 2000s, the administration of President
George W. Bush took a large number of extreme positions on the
executive's constitutional powers relating to war, including the
global war on terror, commissions, detention and torture,
eavesdropping, and signing statements. The most striking defeats
for President Bush included the Supreme Court's decision on
detention issues in the cases of Hamdan, Rasul, and
Boumediene.14 1 Toward the end of President Bush's tenure,
135. The Gulf War occasioned certain appropriation issues. Tens of billions
of dollars to offset the cost of the war came as contributions, principally from
Saudi Arabia. Initially, the Bush administration tried to handle this outside of
congressional control. However, Congress, led by Senator Byrd, got the Bush
administration to treat the funds like Congressional appropriations in terms of
congressional control. FISHER, supra note 1, at 169.
136. TIEFER, THE SEMI-SOVEREIGN PRESIDENCY, supra note 37, at 129-36.
137. Id. at 31-59. A signing statement is a message from the President
accompanying his signing a bill into law, which purports to have significance
akin to a veto message.
138. Presidential Statement on Signing the National Defense Authorization
Act for Fiscal Year 1991, 1 PUB. PAPERS 1556, 1557 (Nov. 5, 1990).
139. See Hartzman, supra note 39; Tiefer, supra note 2, at 321-22.
140. Gerald G. Howard, Comment, Combat in Kosovo: Ignoring the War
Powers Resolution, 38 Hous. L. REv. 261 (2001).
141. See Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723 (2008); Hamdan v. Rumsfeld,
548 U.S. 557 (2006); Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466 (2004).
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Congress renewed the defense of its war powers. Notably, the
House Judiciary Committee held a scholarly hearing in 2007 on
Congress's powers to end a war.142
A demonstration of Congress's power to enact limitations on
defense authorizations and appropriations came in the McCain
amendment forbidding torture. The amendment's dramatic
legislative history showed the capacity of a Congress-even
though of the same party as the President-to insist on reaching
one of the great questions of national security policy (and human
rights) and to resolve it by the venerable method of the defense
spending limitation. 144
Finally, the Obama administration brought further reactions to
its predecessor. However, as it moved forward with its own
national security agenda, it drew its own reactions. An early
instance came in Fall 2009, as consideration took place of General
McChrystal's proposals to commit large numbers of new troops to
Afghanistan. Republican congressional leaders called for
McChrystal to come to Congress and testify during the Obama
administration's consideration of his proposal.145 This may suggest
that at some point in the tenure of President Obama, he, too, will
be considered a President less "hawkish" in some respects than
some elements of his Congresses-like Presidents Adams,
Madison, Lincoln, McKinley, Truman, and Clinton, among others,
before him.
III. CENTRAL ISSUES FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF AND BASIC
ANALYSIS
A. Basic Analysis
This constitutional history suggests an appropriate mechanism
or formula for considering constitutional challenges to provisions
for stepping up a war. That history suggests that Congress may use
certain kinds of appropriation provisions to impact a war, but that
the strongest case by far concerns limitation amendments. The
142. The author's previous article received several mentions and citations.
See CONG. REC. S1475-78 (daily ed. Feb. 1, 2007) (statement of Sen. Arlen
Specter); JENNIFER K. ELSEA ET AL., CONG. RESEARCH SERV., CONGRESSIONAL
AUTHORITY TO LIMIT U.S. MILITARY OPERATIONS IN IRAQ, at CRS-2 n.4 (2008).
143. KOH, supra note 37.
144. David Abramowitz, Taking the Bull by the Horns: Congress and
International Humanitarian Law, 38 GEO. WASH. INT'L L. REv. 599, 610-13
(2006).
145. Tyson, supra note 9.
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formula treats less deferentially the constitutionality of provisions
to step up a war.
This distinction has its roots in two phenomena just treated.
The constitutional text and original intent accord enormous power
to Congress through the "No Appropriations" clause, but only as
used to limit or to constrain military activity. The clause does not
empower Congress to push for more military activity. And, the
survey of two centuries of United States experience shows that
Congress has far more often asserted and vindicated powers to
limit or constrain a war than to step up a war. Stepping up is not
absolutely and totally unprecedented, but, especially in terms of
provisions intruding on the core of the Commander in Chiefs
central concerns in the war zone, it does not have a lot of history
on its side.
The mechanism or formula resembles somewhat Justice
Jackson's three-zone analysis in Youngstown.146 In one category
are the provisions that collide with one of the central issues for the
Commander in Chief-command, disposition of forces, or
campaigning. Suppose the congressional provision as to a military
activity concerns that central issue's core. As a result, a provision
to step up the war starts with a presumption against
constitutionality.
Still dealing with one of the central issues, but outside of its
core, a provision to step up a war would have something less than a
presumption against it-rather, a doubt about its constitutionality.
For example, Congress might enact provisions for the military to
move more forces into countries bordering Afghanistan but that are
not part of the conflict, like Uzbekistan.14 7 Assume the
Commander in Chief disagrees with this disposition of forces. He
does not call it an outright interference with the war, but he
considers it excessive and unduly expensive. 48  Congress
nevertheless passes it to step up the threat of military action on the
enemy in Afghanistan.
Such a provision would come with doubt of some weight about
constitutionality-less than a presumption against it, but still
somewhat. The provision deals with one of the central issues-
disposition of forces-and does so in time of war. However, the
146. See supra note 59.
147. For the significance of Uzbekistan to the United States, see RASHID,
supra note 13, at 161-65.
148. Assume that the President does not maintain that a disposition of forces
in this way would drain strength from the war zone itself, which raises a
different question. Rather, Congress provides additional funding and arranges
for compensating expansion of U.S. forces.
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provision is outside the core. It does not apply in the zone of
combat but rather to other neighboring countries.
At the other extreme, for a shared issue, a provision to step up
a war may start without a presumption of unconstitutionality or
even a strong doubt of constitutionality. Perhaps, as a provision to
step up a war, it would just deserve a searching consideration. On
the one hand, such a provision draws on an Article I congressional
power and a history of congressional action. On the other, it is still
not a provision to limit the war, and hence it warrants some
suspicion.
Congress might enact a provision for opium poppy eradication.
Also, Congress would appropriate funds to pay contracting firms to
perform this task. Oversight would come from the civilian agency
that has overseen poppy eradication and other anti-drug efforts in
the past, the State Department's Bureau of International Narcotics
and Law Enforcement Affairs. Thus, it would primarily be a task
for civilians, rather than for the military in its campaigns.
This is a shared issue: it implicates Congress's Article I
powers, but it does not collide directly with the President's role in
command, disposition of troops, or campaigning. The provision
aims to step up the war, not to limit or constrain it. Hence it starts
with a clean slate or, at most, a plain doubt-not a presumption or
a material doubt, just a doubt. That does not completely resolve the
issue. Rather, the specifics of the issue receive scrutiny. After all,
in a general sense, the provision takes a more aggressive, albeit
controversial, stance toward an outlawed practice harmful to the
world and financially valuable to the Taliban.149 The constitutional
analyst looks back for historical examples and constitutional
support for Congress ordering this. 5 0
Overall, this categorizing mechanism or formula is suggestive
rather than mandatory. Other ways could draw legitimately on the
previous constitutional history. The goal remains weighing the
balance of constitutional powers, and the use of important
historical precedents, in ways that will present and apply as much
factually attuned nuance as possible. Others might imagine a
constitutional analysis that employs more abstract notions or
emphasizes whatever bits and pieces of court opinions have some
relevance. This mechanism mobilizes the history on the basis that
149. As throughout, the author takes no position on policy issues.
Hypothetical examples are posed only to illustrate the constitutional analysis.
And, of course, the author does not speak for his Commission or any other
member thereof.
150. Lobel, supra note 20. For an in-depth treatment of this hypothetical, see
infra Part IV.
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the constitutional lines arise out of historical accretion of the
interaction of the political branches in each particular focused
subject area.
B. Specifics of Commander in Chief Issues
To distill this constitutional history into some functional
methods of analysis requires, first, an establishment of the central
Commander in Chief issues, and their cores, before applying in a
later section, to an analysis of two provisions. One of these two
provisions would charter an intrusive committee to influence
command; another would direct land action against sanctuaries
over the border in Pakistan. Looking at the relation of issues to the
Commander in Chief power, one group of issues is central:
command, disposition of forces, and campaigning. For this central
group, in its core the President can make a stronger case for
asserting the Commander in Chief clause against legislative
intrusion.
A number of Supreme Court opinions, among other sources of
law, have summed up the Commander in Chief power in terms
matching the central issues. For each of these, a hypothetical can
demonstrate the existence of a core in which, presumptively,
Congress may not constitutionally direct the President. However,
historically, particular examples and doctrinal treatments show that
Congress can enact valid legislation even as to these central areas
in their noncore or ambiguous aspects.
1. Command
Congress must respect, at the core of the central issue of
command,' 5 ' the "superintendence principle," 52 namely, as Justice
Jackson put it, that the Commander in Chief clause "undoubtedft
puts the Nation's armed forces under presidential command.""
So, for example, in the Afghanistan war, the "hawkish"
congressional opposition might want to find the most kindred
"hawkish" high military figure, say, the head of the Central
Command. Congress might desire to enact a provision to make him
independent of the chain of command, and thereby to intensify the
war. Such a provision would amount to a thrust by Congress
151. The Tenure of Office Act illustrates Congress attempting to tamper with
this central issue. See supra note 115.
152. Barron & Lederman, A Constitutional History, supra note 4, at 1102-)5.
153. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 641 (1952)
(Jackson, J., concurring).
2011] 419
LOUISIANA LA W RE VIEW
directly at the very core of this central concern of the Commander
in Chief.
As to this central issue but outside its core, Congress has much
to say. Congress has legislated the overall structure of the military
establishment from George Washington's presidency to today.' 54
In the twentieth century, after World War II, Congress finally
faced the problem that no military figure coordinated the Army and
the Navy. This had become an intolerable problem when the land
and sea forces did not coordinate intelligence, leading to the awful
surprise of Pearl Harbor, and did not always effectively coordinate
their land-sea operations. 155
So, Congress enacted the National Security Act of 1947 and
the National Security Act Amendments of 1949, creating the
Department of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff,
respectively.1s6 Of note,'17 Congress provided that the Secretary of
Defense, not the President, gave or transmitted commands to the
military commanders, a critical aspect of the chain of command. 5 8
A decade later, Congress enacted the Department of Defense
Reorganization Act of 1958, introducing the concept of unified and
specified combatant commands that would combine forces from
the different services.159 Finally, in 1986, Congress enacted the
Goldwater-Nichols Act, creating joint commands. 60
In the 2010s, the United States fights two wars: a war in
Afghanistan and a (diminishing role in) a war in Iraq. For both
wars, American forces in-theatre fight under a single unified
Central Command coordinating all the services, as Congress
prescribed by Goldwater-Nichols.' 6 ' As Congress intended,
Central Command means the in-theatre fighting forces have
achieved vastly improved unity and coordination of action.
Presidents could not have achieved this with the pre-statutory
arrangement of independent military services. In other words,
Congress has conducted 60 years of relatively successful statutory
154. It has altered statutorily the top army command. In the 1800s, this varied
between the general with the most seniority and the general chosen by the
President. Barron & Lederman, A Constitutional History, supra note 4, at 957-61.
155. Paul M. Murphy & William M. Koenig, Whither Goldwater-Nichols?,
43 NAVAL L. REV. 183, 184 (1996).
156. Id. at 185-86.
157. Hartzman, supra note 39; Lobel, supra note 4, at 412 n.65.
158. Lobel, supra note 4, at 412 n.65.
159. Id. at 187.
160. Id. at 187-93.
161. Congress's strictures in this regard culminated in the Goldwater-
Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986, undoubtedly the
boldest command reorganizing of the era. Pub. L. No. 99-433, 100 Stat. 992; see
Murphy & Koenig, supra note 155.
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structuring of the concept of a central command, without
constitutional resistance by the executive. The time for arguing that
Congress does not have the power to do so has long passed.
By and large, Presidents must put up with some degree of
intrusive oversight treatment. Another issue concerning command
may arise from congressional oversight of a war. Faced with a
highly intrusive congressional investigation of the conduct of a
war, the President might argue that such oversight interferes with
his commanders' obedience to commands from him.
Regarding command, the tension about what raises
constitutional doubt shows up in one of the major constitutional
clashes of the Clinton administration. Congress sought to limit,162
and President Clinton stood by his power of,163 having American
troops serve under a U.N. commander.' A Justice Department
opinion of much interest designated as unconstitutional a law
barring the President from making such a U.N. command
arrangement.16 5
Observers recognized important counterarguments to the
Justice Department position on a constitutionally mandated option
for the President to have the choice of a U.N. command. The
Justice Department "opinion did not cite, let alone discuss,
Youngstown."' 66 Addressing that key opinion would have required
dealing with how Youngstown puts the President's powers at their
lowest ebb, where the President refuses to obey an express statute
162. The Republican Congress tapped into its political base's dislike for the
United Nations. That base's blame of AWOL United Nations forces for the
trapping of American soldiers during the Somalia intervention was portrayed by
the movie Black Hawk Down.
163. In practice, President Clinton effectively conceded the practical issue,
for purposes of gaining public acceptance. He emphasized that he would put
American troops for the Bosnia deployment under an American general and a
NATO structure, not under the objected-to U.N. command. The word "NATO"
appeared 10 times in President Clinton's address about the commitment (not
counting the additional multiple mentions of "European allies"), while the words
"United Nations" appeared only once to make a contrast. The only mention of
the U.N. was that "American troops will take their orders from the American
general who commands NATO.... [U]nlike the U.N. forces, they will have the
authority to respond immediately." If We're Not There, NA TO Will Not Be ...
Peace Will Collapse, WASH. PosT, Nov. 28, 1995, at A8 (text of President's
address). President Clinton twice noted the command structure for American
forces: that they were "under the command of an American general" and "will
take their orders from the American general." Id.
164. Tiefer, supra note 2, at 321-22.
165. Placing of United States Armed Forces Under United Nations
Operational or Tactical Control, 20 Op. O.L.C. 182 (1996).
166. Barron & Lederman, A Constitutional History, supra note 4, at 1091-
92.
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against U.N. command. A learned opinion by the Bar Association
of the City of New York extensively canvassed the law and history
and came to a more neutral outcome than the Justice
Department.167 Yet, in any event, Congress took only a restraining
or limiting position. Consistent with the negative "No
Appropriations" clause, it told Presidents that they cannot put
forces under U.N. command. Congress did not purport to tell
Presidents affirmatively, out of all the possible command
arrangements, that they must now implement one particular
arrangement for one particular conflict.
2. Disposition ofForces
A second central issue consists of the disposition of forces in
the field. In the Afghanistan war, taking the extreme example,
Congress cannot direct the President to shift additional forces from
northern to southern Afghanistan, even though a congressional
opposition might want to make him do that to intensify the war
further. However, even as to this central issue for the Commander
in Chief of the disposition of forces, Congress has had much to say
about a range of noncore issues. It has spoken often on the
disposition of forces in peacetime and on the eve of warl 68 and has
cut off funds for the military to go into countries neighboring a war
zone.169
For example, in 1940 President Franklin Roosevelt staked his
ability to act in the European war, resolving one of the most
important modern constitutional disputes about the disposition of
forces.170 Roosevelt succeeded in getting the nation's first
peacetime draft through Congress by the bare margin of a single
167. Hartzman, supra note 39 (concluding that although Congress would act
most unwisely, nevertheless, Congress would not act unconstitutionally in
enacting such a provision because of the concurrent nature of Congress's powers
to make rules for the military).
168. Jane E. Stromseth, Rethinking War Powers: Congress, the President,
and the United Nations, 81 GEO. L.J. 597, 635-36 (1993) (discussing the "Great
Debate" in the Senate over deploying troops to Europe in the creation of
NATO).
169. Department of Defense Appropriation Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-171,
§ 3(e), 83 Stat. 469, 487 (1969) (cutting off funds for land operations in Laos
and Cambodia, the neighbors of Vietnam).
170. Roosevelt distinguished between preparedness, with broad public
support, and military intervention in the European war, opposed by major parts
of the public. Republicans, and kindred Democrats, with an isolationist bent
looked for legislative ways not to have the naked stance of opposing
preparedness, but rather to support legislative action to keep America out of the
war. Tiefer, supra note 2, at 303.
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vote in the House. He did so only by accepting a famous condition
of the opposition in Congress: that no draftees be stationed outside
of the Western Hemisphere or the United States.' 7 '
In the spring of 1941, Roosevelt determined to send U.S.
troops to Iceland, outside the Western Hemisphere.' 72 However, he
obeyed the letter of the congressional provision about
deployments.173 This has continued to today as an important
precedent about what Congress may do vis-A-vis the Commander
in Chief.
3. Military Campaigning
A third central issue consists of military campaigning. As the
Afghanistan war goes forward, a "hawkish" congressional
opposition might want to step up the war's intensity. As a blunt
approach, they might desire to enact a mandate for a full-fledged
war throughout the country on a counter-insurgency mission
against even local, dispersed, low-level Taliban activity. But, apart
from simply making more or different resources available, a
Congress attempting to dictate the military campaign mission in
particular campaigns would intrude on the very core of this central
issue.
However, Congress has much to say about campaigning
outside that core of the issue. An example consists of President
Clinton's 1999 campaign against Serbia, to stop its occupation of
Kosovo.174 Congress considered authorizing legislation for a
bombing campaign,1 75 much as it had for the earlier dispatching of
171. The "United States" included its territory and possessions, so stationing
troops in the Philippines was allowed. See Selective Service and Training Act of
1940, ch. 720, § 3(e), 54 Stat. 885, 886.
172. Cooper, supra note 123 (citing SCHLESINGER, supra note 130). He did
this as part of an overall effort in which the U.S. took over from Britain parts of
the Battle of the Atlantic with Germany. His action was obviously at odds with
the spirit of the proviso to keep draftees within the Western Hemisphere and out
of the war zone.
173. He deployed only half the number of troops he wanted, and these
consisted of a mix of Marines (all volunteers, of course, not draftees) and
statutorily eligible Army forces (those who were volunteers, not draftees). See
Barron & Lederman, A Constitutional History, supra note 4, at 1049-50.
174. Geoffrey S. Corn, Clinton, Kosovo, and the Final Destruction of the
War Powers Resolution, 42 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1149 (2001) (discussing the
Kosovo bombing campaigns and how they reflect the breakdown of the War
Powers Resolution in relation to such controversies).
175. Louis Fisher, Presidential Independence and the Power of the Purse, 3
U.C. DAVIS J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 107, 129-37 (1997).
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peacekeeping troops to Bosnia after the Dayton Accords.'7 ' As in
the earlier period, the conressional action had considerable
significance for war powers.
The Kosovo debate notably featured amendments to go beyond
simply authorizing an air campaign and to expressly forbid
supporting it by ground troops. By most definitions this would
constrain the type or scope of campaigning.17 8 The debates over
the scope of campaigning as to Kosovo echoed longstanding
themes in constitutional history. Chief Justice John Marshall's
Supreme Court expounded how Congress could and did decide the
type of naval campaign authorized in the limited Quasi-War with
France of the 1790s. As the Court explained, nations could wage
either "perfect" (unlimited) or "imperfect" (limited) wars, and
Congress made that decision in authorizing war. Moreover, in
the course of the war, Congress could, and did, change the
authorized typre of naval campaign by changing the statutory
authorization.
This kind of issue, more or less, even arose three days after the
9/11 terrorist attack. The carefully worded drafting of that
September 14, 2001 congressional resolution for the
"Authorization of Military Force"' '8 clearly reflects a compromise
in those three days on many points, notably between President
Bush's sweepingly empowering initial proposal and the narrower
focus of the leadership of the then-Democratic Senate, 182
particularly by not authorizing hostilities with Iraq.' 83
176. This was notwithstanding its failure to produce a bicameral enactment.
See Tiefer, War Decisions, supra note 40, at 16 (describing the Chadha
requirements of bicameralism and presentment for congressional actions).
177. Id.
178. Id. Moreover, earlier in the Clinton administration, in response to the ill-
fated American intervention in Somalia, Congress adopted the Byrd and
Kempthorne Amendments, which required American troops to leave that
country by a 1994 deadline and not to return unless Congress approved. For the
background of the Byrd and Kempthorne Amendments, see Rosen, supra note
91, at 11 n.53.
179. Lobel, supra note 4, at 423-30 (discussing the Supreme Court's
decision in Bas v. Tingy, 4 U.S. (4 Dall.) 37 (1800)).
180. Id.
181. Authorization for Use of Military Force, Pub L. No. 107-140, 115 Stat.
224 (2001); see Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 44.
182. The more cautiously drafted compromise version adopted by Congress
no longer authorized hostilities with countries having no share in 9/11. TIEFER,
supra note 42, at 258-59; Abramowitz, supra note 44, at 74.
183. The loose original White House proposal was printed in the
Congressional Record by Senator Robert Byrd (D-W. Va.). 147 CONG. REC.
S9950-52 (daily ed. Oct. 1, 2001).
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In sum, constitutional arguments and historic examples present
three central issues of Presidential war powers and congressional
action. This sets the stage for analyzing concrete provisions that a
"hawkish" Congress might enact.
IV. ANALYSIS: EXAMPLES OF WHAT A "HAWKISH" CONGRESS
MIGHT Do
This Article now examines a series of fuller analyses of
specific hypothetical provisions by which a "hawkish" Congress
could push the President to step up the Afghanistan war. Two of
these, in this Part, collide with two of the executive's central
issues: a law directing the President to attack border sanctuaries,
which collides with the core of the campaigning power; and an
intrusive congressional oversight committee focused on war
decisions, which collides with the periphery of the power of
command. Then this Part discusses issues regarding a war zone
policy of poppy eradication, and regarding the assertion of
presidential power to impound-to refuse to spend-war
appropriations.
A. The Power of Campaigning, Viewed Through the Example of
Directing Presidents to Attack Border "Sanctuaries l84
For many years, the Afghanistan Taliban have taken advantage
of the border shared with Pakistan as a relatively safe haven or
refuge. In 2001-2002, American forces allied with Afghan
elements overthrew the Taliban government of Afghanistan and
forced the Taliban out of the country. At that time, to escape, the
leadership of both the Afghanistan Taliban and Al Qaeda fled
across the border into Pakistan. Since then, the Taliban have used
their Pakistan refuge as a base to build up strength and to support a
move back into Afghanistan. 186
Moreover, the Taliban continue to derive vital support from
their relatively secure safe havens or refuges and allied groups over
184. For further discussion on this topic, see, for example, JONES, supra note
13; RASHID, supra note 13.
185. JONES, supra note 13, at 95-108.
186. Even in the years from 2005 on, the Taliban top leadership remained in
those areas of Pakistan near the border and under minimal control by the
government in Karachi. These areas are the Federally Administered Tribal Areas
and the Northwest Frontier Provinces. In these areas of Pakistan, the central
government has little control. Effectively, local elements share control of the
region, particularly the Pakistani Taliban, who have affinities with the Afghani
Taliban.
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the border.' 87 The United States sufficiently respects the border,
and whatever other tactics the Taliban uses, to not conduct a
substantial incursion or occupation with regular army forces, nor to
treat the area as a taget for regular Air Force bombing campaigns
like Serbia in 1999.1
How to think of such an incursion is a policy debate, not a legal
one, and this Article does not address the policy issue at all.
Rather, this Article posits a plausible hypothetical; someday the
changing relationships among Pakistan, the Taliban, and the
United States may make an incursion not entirely unthinkable,
although still highly debatable. Meanwhile, assume that elections
of the 2010s have strengthened in Congress a coalition of
"hawkish" Republicans and Democrats. Now Congress contrasts
with a "less hawkish" President, who for various policy
considerations refrains from various ways of stepping up the war.
The congressional "hawks" find some ways of stepping up the
war supported by responsible military and political figures (albeit
not by the presidential administration). Moreover, their political
base supports them on some of these ways of stepping up the
war. 189 Part of the debate-not necessarily as major as the policy
issues-would include Congress's dispute with the President about
constitutional justifications, so as to blunt the charge that Congress
transgresses the Commander in Chief's prerogatives. Certain
conditions would create the possibility of a proposal for a cross-
border incursion to move forward toward enactment, in the face of
presidential opposition.190
187. According to public sources, the United States has used pilotless drones
to target Al Qaeda and Taliban leadership in the border areas. Also, the United
States obtained some limited cooperation from the government of Pakistan,
which aided in the effort against Al Qaeda leadership.
188. JONES, supra note 13, at 100-01.
189. Although in this instance the congressional "hawks" push the action, the
political situation has some resemblances to when "less hawkish" congressional
groups have pushed for provisions that step down a war. These include the
Vietnam cut-offs, the Boland Amendments, and the congressional effort in
2007-2008 to enact an Iraq drawdown.
190. As an example of such conditions, suppose that the Pakistani
government and public indicate, for diverse reasons, that they would no longer
take as dim a view of cross-border incursions in particular areas where the
Afghanistan Taliban and its allies have largely taken over and inflicted harm on
Pakistan. And, suppose some influential elements of the American military
believe that a cross-border incursion would deeply impair the Taliban. For a
discussion on the strength of the Pakistani Taliban in the border regions, see
generally RASHID, supra note 13, at 402-08.
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To raise the question squarely, assume Congress rejects all
presidential compromises that would dilute the provision.191
Instead, Congress enacts its provision undiluted, aboard the annual
defense authorization or appropriation.192 The provision steps up
the war by making mandatory appropriations available. And, it
further prescribes that the military "shall" undertake an incursion
into Taliban border sanctuaries in Pakistan. To show deference to
the Commander in Chief, the provision leaves to him the decisions
as to the incursion about who, what, when, how, and how long-
almost everything except "whether."
1. The Cambodia and Laos Analogy
Such a provision to step up the war, by mandating a cross-
border incursion, implicates one of the central issues for the
Commander in Chief, his control over campaigning. Such a
provision implicates that issue at its core. It does not dilute the
impact by, for example, laying down some general rules for cross-
border operations, the way the Geneva Conventions lay down
some general rules for detention or the Goldwater-Nichols Act
lays down general rules for unified commands.193 This provision
lays down no general rule at all but dictates about campaigning in
this specific location in this specific theatre of war at this specific
time. And, it mandates use of both types of military arms-ground
and air forces alike.
A search for a historical analogy leads straight to President
Nixon's incursions into Laos and Cambodia. These occurred
without congressional authorization (apart from the general
191. Normally, Presidents seek with some success to deflect congressional
attempts to direct their war-fighting activities. In this case, the President might
seek to preempt legislation of an unwanted kind by allowing a congressional
provision for a cross-border operation in the form of a "sense-of-the-Congress
provision." Or, the President might reduce his opposition by proposing a
provision providing that the President could defer operations if he certified that
to do so would be against the national interest. Finally, the President might step
up the effort in the border areas, without going as far as an incursion. In a classic
example, President Kennedy defused a controversy over a mandatory
appropriation for a plane procurement he had threatened to impound, by saying
he would accept the appropriation so long as it was discretionary rather than
mandatory. See Stanton, supra note 34, at 13.
192. For the system of annual authorizations and appropriations, see BANKS
& RAVEN-HANSEN, supra note 1.
193. Another form of dilution is simply to not go up to the limit of what a
court has previously struck down. See Mario L. Barnes & F. Greg Bowman,
Entering Unprecedented Terrain: Charting a Method to Reduce Madness in
Post-9/11 Power and Rights Conflicts, 62 U. MIAMI L. REV. 365, 411-12
(2008).
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authority cited for the Vietnam War, namely, the Tonkin Gulf
Resolution of 1964). 194 Mainly, like the Afghanistan hypothetical,
and like examples from wars even further back,' 95 those supporting
the incursions into Cambodia and Laos appealed to the public by a
popular argument: we should not let the enemy kill American and
allied soldiers by operating out of "sanctuaries."l 96
Then-Assistant Attorney General William H. Rehnquist-later
Chief Justice-and Secretary of State William Rogers provided the
legal justification for President Nixon's Cambodia incursion
without specific congressional authorization.' 97 Rehnquist drew on
past discussions of the Commander in Chief power, in general, and
his responsibility for military campaigns, in particular. Congress
responded by cutting off funds for such incursions. These cut-off
provisions dramatized Congress's decision in the 1970s to restore
its powers in the national security context.'9 8
Returning to the hypothetical, the Commander in Chief does not
seek to widen the Afghanistan war. He protests Congress's intrusion
by so much more than a mere negative cut-off appropriation
limitation. He protests Congress telling him whether to campaign, in
many aspects: whether to spend money and to deploy forces, rather
than save the money and not deploy the forces; whether to put his
forces into a region or to keep them out; and whether to take on the
194. For a discussion of the Tonkin Gulf Resolution, see Ely, The American
War in Indochina, Part I, supra note 36, at 884-97.
195. During the Korean War, proponents of a more vigorous military effort
complained that the Communist side's military benefitted from "sanctuaries" in
Manchuria, and that their aircraft used bases across the Korean border as
"sanctuaries." MacArthur discussed this view in his famous speech before a
joint session of Congress: "The tragedy of Korea is further heightened by the
fact that its military action was confined to its territorial limits. It condemns that
nation, which it is our purpose to save, to suffer the devastating impact of full
naval and air bombardment while the enemy's sanctuaries are fully protected
from such attack and devastation." MacArthur's Speeches: "Old Soldiers Never
Die, " PBS.ORG, http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/amex/macarthur/filmmore/reference/
primary/macspeechO5.html (last visited Oct. 18, 2010) (emphasis added).
196. The Cambodian incursion had ulterior reasons hidden from the public.
Similarly, some of those allied with congressional hawks might have a national
security justification for a cross-border incursion, such as a need to prop up the
Pakistani government.
197. Memorandum from William H. Rehnquist, Assistant Attorney Gen.,
Office of Legal Counsel, to the Honorable Charles W. Colson, Special Counsel
to the President, Re: The President and the War Power: South Vietnam and the
Cambodian Sanctuaries (May 22, 1970), reprinted in William H. Rehnquist, The
Constitutional Issues-Administration Position, 45 N.Y.U. L. REV. 628 (1970);
see William Rogers, The Constitutionality of the Cambodian Incursion, in 3 THE
VIETNAM WAR AND INTERNATIONAL LAW: THE WIDENING CONTEXT 175, 176
(R. Falk ed., 1972).
198. FRANCK & WEISBAND, supra note 134, at 13-33.
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enemy in that region besides others. More broadly, Congress has
dictated to him regardless of whether this particular incursion fits
with his overall strategy for the war. Especially, Congress has forced
his hand irrespective of whether it fits the overall war strategy to be
going deeper into the war by an incursion that expands the war,
rather than stabilizing or drawing down.199
2. Other Analysis
Nor does the congressional action in ordering a cross-border
operation correspond to one of the established "Declare War"
categories of Congress authorizing, but not controlling, the use of
force. 200 When Congress declares or authorizes war, Congress
creates the legal authority for the war to proceed, but leaves to the
Commander in Chief, within limitations, the decision of the strategy
for the war.201 To put it differently, Congress could merely provide
discretionary appropriations and a discretionary authorization,
without directing a cross-border incursion. Congress could let the
Commander in Chief decide whether the incursion fits the overall
strategy for the war. Each branch would have its separate role.
On the other hand, a mandated stepping-up of the war to go
after border sanctuaries differs greatly from Congress declaring or
authorizing war pursuant to the "Declare War" clause.202 For
Congress to order an operation such as an incursion, in the midst of
a previously authorized war, intrudes deep into the Commander in
Chief's command role. To be sure, some in-between or hybrid
examples would challenge this neat dichotomy between what
Congress can and cannot do in terms of indicating to the President
199. Congress might well make the argument that it chooses to go after
sanctuaries in order to shorten the war, reduce casualties, and facilitate a
drawdown. For example, President Nixon justified the Laos and Cambodia
incursions that way. To be sure, anyone urging an incursion, whether Congress
or the President, will make that kind of argument, and different segments of the
public may be more or less responsive to it. In simple terms of legal analysis,
though, the difference between a restrictive appropriation rider, like a cut-off
after a deadline, and a "step-up" rider, like a mandated incursion, is in how the
provision operates, not in debatable calculations of its ultimate strategic impact.
A restrictive appropriation rider triggers the potent "No Appropriations" clause,
because it stops the President from obtaining funding from the Treasury for an
action. A mandated incursion rider directs the President to obtain such funding.
However, their debatable strategic implications do not enter into this distinction.
200. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 11.
201. The President's situation in this hypothetical is a little like Franklin
Roosevelt's in 1942, when deciding how much to push against Germany and
how much to push against Japan. In either situation, the Commander in Chief
retains complete authority to decide how to conduct campaigns during wartime.
202. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 11.
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that he should deal with a cross-border enemy sanctuary. 203 Even
so, a vital distinction would still apply in congressional provisions
between restrictive versus expansive, and discretionary versus
mandatory provisions.
In terms of campaigning, Congress would be ordering that the
military conduct a specific campaign. Congress would establish a
kind of unfiltered relationship with the military of giving them
campaign direction, regardless of presidential views.
To be sure, as noted, Congress could leave much discretion to
the President about the who, what, when, how, and how long of the
incursion. Some in-between or hybrid examples would challenge
this neat dichotomy. Still, the significance of this position shows in
applying it to historic "less hawkish" Presidents and "more
hawkish" Congresses. By this formulation, a more powerful group
of "War Hawks" in Congress could not have directed a more
reluctant President Madison to invade Canada; a powerful group of
imperialist-minded congressmen could not have directed a more
reluctant President McKinley to take the Philippines; and a rabidly
hawkish group of congressmen during the Korean War could not
have directed a reluctant President Truman to bomb Manchuria.
B. Example: Intrusive Oversight of Command
1. Specific Mechanism
Ordinarily, Congress uses its standing committees to conduct
oversight of the subjects within their jurisdiction.204 As to military
203. In light of the Quasi-War of 1798, Congress has flexibility in declaring
or authorizing a war, and in giving directions about its scope. Arguably,
Congress could declare war on a dominant, if non-state, element across the
border in Pakistan, and thereby oblige the President to go wage a war with that
element. Certainly the authorization of war by Congress could restrict the
President to waging only an air war or only a ground war, but Congress would
go much farther in trying to mandate that the President wage only a ground war.
Congress could authorize the President to fight those cross-border elements, and
a President who disregarded that authorization would be on thin ice. However, a
President could conscientiously wage a different war than Congress had in
mind-by not sending regular troops in an incursion, for example. The President
would couple stepped-up air operations with stepped-up Special Forces raids.
Although Congress would want more, the President could claim, with some
justice, that he had carried out the authorization of war within his own
discretionary control over the scale and nature of campaigning.
204. For military matters, the armed services committees, and perhaps the
defense appropriations subcommittees, would have the main oversight
responsibility. Other committees might help. The government operations
committees, for example, have government-wide jurisdiction and may conduct
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operations, since World War II Congress has established the
annual defense authorization bill as a means to empower its armed
services committees to conduct military oversight.20 5 In wartime,
these armed services committees will call on the top civilian
defense figures, and sometimes also the highest military figures, to
discuss issues related to the war. The committees are supposed to
devote themselves to policy issues, not to the review of purely
military decisions. As part of this limitation, only very rarely do
the committees call upon the subordinate military officers closer to
field units in the theatre of war. In particular, committees rarely
call on such field commanders to take part in a public hearing
process of criticism or advice on their conduct of purely military
206
operations.26 Such a process would have the potential to push
alternatives to presidential direction.
However, a "hawkish" majority in Congress could make the
strategic decision to step up the war by means of a powerful forum
to give criticism or advice directly to the military commanders in
the field about just such stepping up. Because the majority party
has the greater influence over committee establishment and
appointment, this heightened influence would matter most if the
opposition party held the majority. Still, it would matter some,
particularly in the Senate,207 even if the President's party held the
majority, assuming those of "hawkish" views had a majority
counting supporters in both parties. The committees would take
special advantage of latent "hawkish" views of the military that
would be common among the majority. The "hawks" could pursue
several special goals. First, they could set up a Select Committee
on the War in Afghanistan, with membership coming from the top
oversight of a war. These oversight committees obey certain measures of
restraint.
205. See generally BANKS & RAVEN-HANSEN, supra note 1.
206. For example, Congress did not hold hearings about the single greatest
disappointment in the otherwise strikingly successful 2001-2002 military
campaign in Afghanistan: the failure to capture or kill Osama bin Laden at Tora
Bora. A search of the LexisNexis database for Committee Hearing Transcripts
for "Tora Bora w/100 hearing" found many mentions in Administration press
briefings but not any hearings with questions for generals.
207. In the Senate, when the parties have a close balance, the majority
leadership, even if they are of the President's party, must bend to powerful
bipartisan sentiment in such matters. In a recent example, the Republican
Congress of the 2000s created a 9/11 commission, even though it might have
criticized some of the Bush administration's inadequacies prior to 9/11. Public
sentiment demonstrating a strong desire for such a commission led to its
creation, notwithstanding some opposing sentiment from the majority party in
Congress.
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"hawkish" figures on and off the armed services committee.
This would give the "hawks" a star role. The Select Committee
could have power to subpoena military figures for hearings, with a
congressional expectation that they will do so regardless of the
President's displeasure with that approach.
Furthermore, the committee would schedule non-public
meetings (in Washington and on in-theatre trips) with key figures
regardless of their amenability to public hearings. 209 Also, the
armed services and defense appropriation committees could break
the large lump-sum appropriations usually used to pay for wars
into smaller pieces that make it easier for Congress to manipulate
the purse strings.2 10 The "hawks" in the House and Senate would
assure that the Select Committee's reports would influence or
shape the appropriations for the war. In effect, the fight for
congressional influence over the war would go up, from the
consensus-oriented armed services committees, to more "hawkish"
and radical bodies.
The purpose of the Special Committee would include direction
of the maximum adverse attention to every aspect of the
President's war efforts criticized by the "hawkish" parts of
Congress and the public. 2 12 Such oversight would make it more
difficult for the administration to pursue its course. Beyond
directing the public's attention, such an effort might aim at
persuading or obliging the administration to change course in the
desired direction to some degree. It would direct a stream of
proposals, some in public hearings, some in private meetings,
expecting that to the extent the administration could not defend its
course of action, it must adopt some of the most popular measures.
208. The House and Senate could set these up in each chamber or have a
joint committee. For simplicity in description, it will be assumed that just one
chamber sets one up.
209. Those seen in meetings might include the National Security Adviser,
generals with assignments in the field rather than their superiors, ambassadors to
Afghanistan and Pakistan, and those on field trips to Afghanistan (high officials
in that government).
210. BANKS & RAVEN-HANSEN, supra note 1, at 69-70.
211. The nominations for defense posts that supervise aspects of the war,
such as the Secretary of the Army, require the Senate to decide upon
confirmation. Prior to Senate vote, the Senate Committee on Armed Services
must vote on reporting the nomination favorably. The Senate could signal, by a
resolution saying so, that it will give weight, in deciding on such confirmation,
on the views of the committee on the war.
212. Had such an effort occurred during the Vietnam War-say, by war-
skeptics in 1967-68-it would have gone into the poor strategy, the unreliable
and corrupt local government, the concealed-cost projects, the ineffectiveness of
the bombing campaign, the intelligence failures, the devastating impact of the
Tet Offensive, and so on.
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2. MacArthur and Civil War Inquiries
No matter what Congress does in this context, it draws on the
strong support in the Framers' original intent for Congress to
conduct oversight. A powerful series of precedents includes review
of problematic issues in wars.2 13 Of course, Congress throughout
the nation's history has contributed invaluably by oversight, in
wartime as well as peacetime, of waste, fraud, and abuse. The
classic example of such inquiry was the Truman Committee during
World War 11.214
Of the great modem examples of high-level congressional
oversight of the conduct of military action itself, the MacArthur
Inquiry of 1951 stands out as involving an unrivaled review of
war-fighting strategy, 215 althoug there are other fabled examples
such as the Fulbright hearings and the "national commitments"
report reacting to the Vietnam War.217 In the 1951 example,
President Truman had relieved General Douglas MacArthur as
commander in the Korean War.2 18 The Senate arranged lengthy
hearings about MacArthur's strategic views. Committee witnesses
included the secretaries of the State and Defense departments, the
chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the service chiefs, and an
array of other top military and other officials. 2 19
That inquiry probed deeply into the highest levels of military
strategy. These included MacArthur's desires, as a historian
summarizes, of "lifting restrictions on bombing Chinese territory,
imposing a naval blockade against the China coast, and putting the
troops of Chiang Kai-shek in the battle against the 'Red
Chinese."' 22
0
213. The very first congressional investigation consisted of a select House
committee looking into a disastrous battle with Indians of the Ohio Valley.
George C. Chalou, St. Clair's Defeat, 1792, in CONGRESS INVESTIGATES, 1792-
1974, at 1 (Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr. & Roger Bruns eds., 1975).
214. Theodore Wilson, The Truman Committee, 1941, in CONGRESS
INVESTIGATES, 1792-1974, supra note 213, at 327.
215. John Edward Wiltz, The MacArthur Inquiry, 1951, in CONGRESS
INVESTIGATES, 1792-1974, supra note 213, at 385.
216. Louis Fisher, War and Spending Prerogatives: Stages of Congressional
Abdication, 19 ST. Louis U. PUB. L. REV. 7, 24-25 (2000); Reinstein &
Silverglate, supra note 14. For Senator Fulbright's own insightful reflections on
his historic hearings, see generally J. William Fulbright, Foreword to GLENNON,
supra note 1, at xiii n.2.
217. GLENNON, supra note 1, at 88, 180.
218. He did so after MacArthur publicly espoused a very different and far
more militant strategy than the administration's as to how the United States
should conduct the Korean War and other contemporary efforts.
219. Tiefer, supra note 2, at 339.
220. Wilson, supra note 214, at 397.
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History has viewed the MacArthur Inquiry benignly, not
questioning its constitutionality. The leading historian, asking
rhetorically "whether the MacArthur inquiry served any useful
purpose," declared, "[t]he answer is an unqualified yes . . . the
inquiry defused the MacArthur controversy," including largely
layin Ito rest MacArthur's proposals for escalating the Korean
War.
In contrast, a President opposing the most intrusive
congressional oversight of the Afghanistan war may cite the most
criticized instance of intrusive wartime oversight in all of U.S.
history, namely, the Joint Committee on the Conduct of the War,
during the Civil War.222 The Joint Committee constantly brought
before it commanders in the field and grilled them on their recent
military efforts, from commanders at particular battles all the way
up to Ulysses S. Grant.223 At one point it met with the President
and his whole Cabinet as part of a general pattern in which no one,
not President Lincoln and certainly not Secretary of War Stanton,
said "no" to them. This suggests the possible acquisition by the
Joint Committee of influence in the chain of command.224
Moreover, the Joint Committee kept up an extensive stream of
military advice to Lincoln.
Even so, Lincoln's response to advice with "typical light irony"
showed that "Lincoln was not going to take seriously the advice
they kept urging on him."225 While critics attributed to Lincoln
some very negative views of the Joint Committee, "Lincoln never
committed such thoughts to paper himself, nor does he ever seem
to have allowed the committee to usurp his constitutional powers
as Commander in Chief."22 6 Further limiting its influence, although
a few generals supported the committee, was the fact that "[m]ost
of the military, however, bitterly resented the committee's
investigations as unwarranted and totally undeserved
interference."227 So this committee did not find military support for
what it wanted to do, and thereby lacked what would potentially be
the main tool to shape a strategy deviating from the President's.
221. Id. at 423.
222. See TAP, supra note 62; Elisabeth Joan Doyle, The Conduct of the War,
1861, in CONGRESS INVESTIGATES, 1792-1974, supra note 213, at 63.
223. Doyle, supra note 222, at 91.
224. Id. at 79 ("Secretary of War Stanton, especially ... was so amiable in
his relations with them as to lay himself open to charges of being the Radicals'
representative in meetings of the Cabinet.").
225. Id. at 76.
226. Id.
227. Id. at 95.
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The committee got very bad press in the first century after it, but
has gotten better treatment by historians in recent decades. 22 8
Thus, as a crude yardstick, one might compare a congressional
oversight inquiry tasked with very "hawkish" review of the
conduct of the Afghanistan war with two predecessors that cast
large but different shadows: the criticized Civil War Joint
Committee and the benign MacArthur Inquiry. Using these as
rough markers, an inquiry may legitimately bring top officials
before it, including top generals (albeit without interfering with
their involvement in campaigning); pose questions about strategy;
and even signal congressional preferences for one view over
another. And, that committee's reports may influence
appropriations and nominee confirmations.
The President may legitimately object that the inquiry crosses
the constitutional line when it substantially undermines the
obedience of military commanders to orders. That could happen if
the committee repeatedly took more commanders from the field,
criticized them for not pushing harder than what came through the
chain of command, and achieved substantial success in doing so.
An important factor consists of whether the field commanders
themselves develop pent-up resentment of what they consider
insufficiently "hawkish" leadership coming down from the
President. The field commanders could begin to take into account
the committee's advice, public support, and influence on
congressional appropriations. Such commanders would feel
enabled to deviate from the "less hawkish" line of the Commander
in Chief. Even then, the committee would not necessarily succeed
in wooing commanders far from their normally extremely powerful
allegiance to the President and his high command. And, only then
would a congressional committee intrude so far and so deeply into
command as to raise a material doubt about its constitutionality.
C. Shared Powers: The Example of Poppy Eradication
This Part moves on from the central Commander in Chief
issues to those "shared" with Congress. A "shared issue," for this
Article's purposes, occurs in a war zone and, by making policy,
may affect the conduct of the war by the Commander in Chief.
228. This better treatment may owe to both the more objective and deeper
inquiries of recent historians, and perhaps greater understanding of the
viewpoint of the Radical Republicans in Congress. Improved treatment by
historians may also owe to the very good record of modem investigations like
the Truman Committee and the MacArthur Inquiry, which restored confidence
in congressional wartime oversight.
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However, it does so without specifically interfering with the
Commander in Chief's central issues of command, disposition of
forces, or campaigning.
Broadly speaking, many aspects of context shape the
constitutional analysis of a shared issue. 229 Considering these
contextual aspects, and their relationship with constitutional text or
tradition, Congress may have a large valid role. Congress may
draw support from direct application of one of Congress's
specifically enumerated Article I powers relating to war. That is,
the issue of shared war-related authority has substantially more of
an Article I connection to Congress than merely its involving, like
all government operations, congressional appropriations.
For example, the issue may arise of what to do with captured
property. This does arise in the war zone, but it does not involve
command, disposition of forces, or even campaigning. Moreover, it
does involve express Article I congressional powers over the
making of policy. 30 This mix of factors makes it a shared issue.
Furthermore, a shared issue may have some kind of history or
precedents. This may or may not favor Presidents. For example,
Presidents have a history of providing for the administration of
occupied territory until Congress does. This means that Congress
has not only the potential, but also the record, for sharing in the
power. Congress may have even let its role lapse for a while and
then reclaimed it. By doing so, Congress clarifies that it shares
these areas.231
Three areas illustrate concretely how Article I, and the history
of Congress's activity, shape the constitutional analysis of shared
issues. First, an issue of international law that has had a dramatic
role in the 2000s, the Bush administration believed it had extreme
wartime powers of not being constrained by the Geneva
Conventions in handling Guantanamo detainees.2 2 The Framers
shaped Article I so that primarily Congress, not the President,
would authorize exceptions to international law.233 And, Congress
has compiled an impressive history of relevant action.
229. See Michael J. Glennon, The Use of Custom in Resolving Separation of
Powers Disputes, 64 B.U. L. REv. 109 (1984).
230. See Kent, supra note 63.
231. During the reform era of the 1970s after Vietnam and Watergate,
Congress reclaimed its role in a number of areas it had let lapse to some degree.
Congress revisited issues of initiating war, making international agreements,
making policy for foreign and military aid, overseeing intelligence and covert
actions, overcoming executive privilege in national security matters, and curbing
impoundments, among other issues. FRANCK & WEISBAND, supra note 134.
232. See Lobel, supra note 4.
233. See Kent, supra note 63.
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Second, take the issue of oversight of intelligence or covert
actions. The issue had a dramatic role in the 2000s as President
Bush asserted extreme wartime powers such as warrantless
eavesdropping on phone conversations.234 Prior to this, in the
1970s, Congress revived its role by the creation of congressional
intelligence committees, establishment of the system of annual
intelligence authorization laws, and enactment of specific major
legislation.235 Observers analyzing the making of policy for the
new eavesdropping could, and some did, find solid footing for
Congress's role in that history.
Furthermore, take the issue of rules for the conduct of
warfare.236 Article I charges Congress to "make Rules for the
Government and Regulation of the land and naval Forces." 237
Moreover, Article I also charges Congress to "make Rules
concerning Captures on Land and Water," 23 8 a provision of
renewed importance when the issues of detainees became
prominent in the 2000s. 239 From these grants of power to make
rules and regulations has come far more than merely manuals of
court-martial procedures.240
Third, a last large area of shared powers concerns military
spending. The holding back of appropriated spending is termed an
"impoundment." An extensive history concerns the congressional
handling of appropriations, including military appropriations. In
the last century, Congress has mainly gone from more specific line
items that constrained the executive to lump-sum appropriations
that gave the executive great spending discretion.
Sometimes Presidents have impounded appropriations rather
than spent them. The issue came to a climax in the Nixon
administration, with President Nixon apparently asserting a vast
power to make impoundments. The Nixon administration
impounded more domestically, where the administration wanted to
234. See Ford, supra note 47; Kitrosser, supra note 47.
235. FRANK J. SMIST, JR., CONGRESS OVERSEES THE UNITED STATES
INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY, 1947-1989 (1990). In the era from World War II to
the 1970s, Congress had somewhat slept on its duties of authorization and
oversight of the activities of the intelligence agencies generally. Id.
236. See Lobel, supra note 4.
237. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 14; see also Diane H. Mazur, Rehnquist's
Vietnam: Constitutional Separatism and the Stealth Advance of Martial Law, 77
IND. L.J. 701, 707 (2002).
238. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 14.
239. Stephen I. Vladeck, Congress, the Commander-in-Chief and the
Separation of Powers After Hamdan, 16 TRANSNAT'L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS.
933, 963 (2007).
240. For example, these powers of Congress encompass directions for the
treatment of detainees, a very big issue in the Iraq and Afghanistan conflicts.
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save money, than it impounded military expenditures with which it
was not so unhappy. The Nixon position collapsed, mainly by the
enactment of the Impoundment Control Act of 1974, which closed
the prior loopholes used to justify impoundments. 24 1
As to military spending, the modem system of mainly lump-
sum military appropriations has given the Defense Department
considerable scope. The Department must respect the committee
reports that loosely structure those lump sums and must consult
sufficiently with the committees to make limited funding
redirections during the fiscal year. Beyond these requirements, it
has discretion. When Presidents want to bring a weapons program
or the like to an end, they enter the lists for the annual
appropriations used for combat and accept the result. Should they
not succeed, they have no beef with the constitutional system and
no right to impound, just as they have no right to make a line item
veto. They simply did not have the votes.
Still, the issue of whether Congress can step up a war by
appropriations provisions may bring back the issue of military
impoundments. A President not wanting to obey appropriation
provisions to go after Taliban border sanctuaries or to launch a
poppy eradication program may cast his military spending
impoundment as somehow different from defiance of laws. 24 2 in
that way, the President would go looking for precedents in which
other Presidents have justified-very rarely-sizable military
impoundments (extremely rarely, if ever, in a war zone).
1. Analysis
The hypothetical for analysis concerns a program of poppy
eradication in Taliban-dominated areas, which exemplifies how
congressional policymaking may influence the war zone. Afghan
opium poppy growing constitutes a double menace. Afghanistan
provides the lion's share of the raw material for the deadly world
heroin trade. In addition, the Taliban obtain substantial revenue
from opium poppies.
The United States could launch a program against opium
poppies by large-scale aerial defoliation. However, the Bush and
Obama administrations have not carried out such a program.243
241. See Seema Mittal, Note, The Constitutionality of an Expedited
Rescission Act: The New Line Item Veto or a New Constitutional Method of
Achieving Deficit Reduction, 76 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 125 (2007).
242. See Timothy R. Harner, Presidential Power to Impound Appropriations
for Defense and Foreign Relations, 5 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 131 (1982).
243. See generally, e.g., Associated Press, US. to Shift Approach to
Afghanistan's Drug Trade, L.A. TIMES, Jun. 28, 2009, at A26.
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Partly, these administrations have feared the alienation of poppy-
growing farmers.244 The U.S. would prefer to wean Afghan
growers off poppies onto substitute crops. Crop substitution, unlike
the blunt step of destroying their livelihood by defoliation, would
avoid their taking up arms on the side of the Taliban. Partly, both
administrations appear to have been held back by the Afghan
government's reluctance to support such a program.
Such a self-imposed policy limitation offers the type of issue
that might bring out differences in "hawkishness" and, in turn, the
constitutional clash. The President starts out refusing to implement
in the war zone a particular policy that is aggressive but considered
risky. In Congress, a "hawkish" opposition may have the votes for
an appropriation provision that mandates the expenditure of a half-
billion dollars for eradication. May the Commander in Chief refuse
to proceed with the mandated spending program?
On such an issue, the analysis no longer concerns the central
issues of the Commander in Chief on which the President's
position starts out at maximum strength: command, disposition of
246forces, and campaigning. Rather, this issue involves the more
level playing field of "shared" issues-issues only incidental to the
Commander in Chief's power. Congress still must share these
issues with the President because they occur in the war zone and
may affect the locals or the enemy.
2. The Confiscation Act of 1862
One of history's most striking warzone congressional programs
that the President opposed has received scholarly attention
lately. 247 During the first half of the Civil War, a major evolving
issue consisted of what the Union armies would do with
244. JONES, supra note 13, at 196-97.
245. The Afghan government's reluctance to have such a program may stem
from concerns about alienating its farming population, corruption in the
government, or both.
246. Assume that contractors hired by the State Department's Bureau of
International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs could perform almost all
the work so that it would hardly affect the disposition of forces. Contractor
defoliation would not significantly affect the command of regular military forces
and the campaign of those forces. Eradication would have an impact on the
locals and on the enemy, and thus, incidentally, on campaigning. That it has an
incidental impact neither rules in nor rules out presidential arguments, but
merely distinguishes the issue from those, like a mandate for cross-border
incursions, in which congressional action concerns central issues directly, not
merely incidentally.
247. See Barron & Lederman, A Constitutional History, supra note 4; Lobel,
supra note 4.
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Confederate slaves encountered during military campaigns. 248 This
issue came to a head in the congressional debate on the
Confiscation Act of 1862. This historical example has some
parallels to today's issues. Slaves, like opium poppies, were
contraband of war-treated by the other side in each conflict as its
property and by the United States side as subject to, respectively,
liberation (of slaves) or eradication (of poppies) in a way that
voided those property rights without due process or compensation.
On the other hand, Presidents were concerned about antagonizing
neutrals in the conflict by overly aggressive action.24 9
As to the contraband of 1862, on one hand were the Radical
Republicans in Congress, who sought from slave owners
maximum confiscation of, and freedom for, the slaves. This
appealed to the Radical Republicans both from abolitionist
sympathies and from a desire to take harsh ("hawkish") measures
toward the enemy.
On the other hand, objections included President Lincoln's that
the timing was not yet ripe for such a measure. Lincoln reversed
the orders (prior to legislation) of officers-orders that could be
called "hawkish"-to free such slaves. 250 As he said about a
similar step, it would "alarm our Southern Union friends, and turn
them against us-perhaps ruin our rather fair prospect for
Kentucky." 251
Of note, some opponents of the measure raised Commander in
Chief arguments.252 As one Senator discussed,
If Congress could not regulate such "active operations in
the field"-could not "direct the movements of the
Army"-[he] reasoned, it necessarily followed that neither
could Congress require the President to confiscate enemy
property, or to perform any of the other wartime functions
traditionally determined by the Commander in Chief. 253
Another Senator reasoned that
the Constitution declares that the President is Commander
in Chief of the Army and Navy, "investing him with the
248. Lobel, supra note 4, at 431.
249. The border states that Lincoln wanted to keep in the Union had slave
owners who did not necessarily actively support the Confederacy. The Afghan
poppy farmers similarly do not necessarily actively support the Taliban.
250. Lobel, supra note 4, at 431.
251. Barron & Lederman, A Constitutional History, supra note 4, at 1010.
252. Some opponents pressed other issues: that it violated the laws of war;
that it was an uncompensated taking of property; and that the Constitution might
not permit Congress to do this. Id. at 1011-12.
253. Id. at 1014 (quoting Senator Browning).
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war-making power," and "[h]e is the commander ... only
restrained in so far by Congress in that he must depend
upon them to foot his bill and authorize his levies." 254
This argument lost out. President Lincoln objected to the bill
but never joined in a Commander in Chief argument.255 Congress
enacted it in a slight moderated form, giving some respect to
Lincoln's objections.
These political stances of Congress and the President, although
rooted in their own time and circumstances, contain some
suggestions for a debate today about a shared policy issue in a war
zone, like poppy eradication. Both policy issues have as their
driving engine a wartime, war zone program that the Commander
in Chief opposes as too "hawkish." This opposition consists of that
program's visiting harm on those on the enemy's side, loosely
speaking-Confederate slaveholders then and Taliban obtaining
funding from Afghan poppies today-who anger the public and the
members of Congress into calling for harsh measures. Meanwhile,
the Commander in Chief does not want to bum his country's
bridges to those not really on the enemy's side and susceptible of
being won over or at least staying neutral.
So, the Commander in Chief and those who support him may
argue that Congress's pushing the President amounts to intruding
into campaigning. But, it does not directly concern this. The
legislation does not instruct the President about whether or how to
employ the military in the field. The constitutional dispute occurs
on a level playing field, not with a presumption or strong doubt as
to its constitutionality.
3. Contemporary War Policy Provisions
The Iraq insurgency provides further insight about Congress's
power to legislate shared policy aspects even in the war zone. A
portentous change occurred in the election of 2006, which brought
a change in both the House and the Senate from a Republican to a
Democratic majority. The issue of Iraq was at the forefront in the
Congress of 2007-2008. President Bush fought off legislative
proposals for a drawdown or for setting a deadline for withdrawal.
When Congress enacted a supplemental appropriation in 2007, it
included a provision for timetables for phased redeployment of the
257troops. President Bush vetoed this, saying that "the measure
254. Lobel, supra note 4, at 431 (quoting Senator Cowan).
255. Barron & Lederman, A Constitutional History, supra note 4, at 1015.
256. Id.
257. 63 CQ ALMANAC 2-57(2007).
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'infringes upon the powers vested in the presidency by the
Constitution."' 258 In the attempted, but unsuccessful, veto override,
"Democrats used the floor debate to dispute the president's
assertion that they were infringing on his rights as commander in
chief and his criticism that they were trying to micromanage the
war by substituting their judgment for that of military
commanders." 259
Apart from the legislated drawdown attempt, a few important
proposals did win passage as appropriation bills in this Congress,
reflecting the limits of what the Commander in Chief's argument
could defeat. 260 In 2008, Congress enacted a striking provision that
included a "ban on using funds authorized by the bill to establish
permanent military bases in Iraq." 26 1 Congress had traditionally
exercised the power in peacetime to decide when to use funds to
establish permanent bases. This provision went further and
exercised that power in the war zone. Congress had debated a
number of such provisions, eliminating or rewriting some that the
White House threatened to veto. Congress retained others,
particularly "language aimed at continuing congressional oversight
of the wars." 262
The outcome of the Confiscation Act, like that of contemporary
defense authorization provisions, indicates that such a program as a
mandated poppy eradication program would not necessarily fall
prey of constitutional doubts. In fact, the Confiscation Act in 1862
did make a leap forward in its aspect of the Civil War-the freeing
of slaves-and in this respect it anticipated the further step forward
in the Emancipation Proclamation.
Accordingly, the "shared" issues remain openly debatable
between Congress and the President, focusing on their particular
subject, drafting, purposes, and so on. Unlike the "central" issues
of the Commander in Chief, these do not start with a presumption
or doubt against them, even when they step up a war.
D. Impounded Funding for Programs to Step Up a War
258. Id. at 2-58.
259. Id.
260. An important proposal concerned the aftermath of the Nisur Square
incident, in which a shooting by Blackwater private security contractors killed
many civilians. The defense authorization law carried a provision for the
Defense Secretary to set regulations for the selection, training, and conduct of
private security personnel in combat zones. Id. at 6-10.
261. 64 CQ ALMANAC 6-7 (2008). Admittedly, this is a classic restrictive and
limiting appropriation rider. The views of the Congress of 2007-2008 were no
more "hawkish" about Iraq than those of President Bush.
262. Id.
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A "hawkish" opposition in Congress may enact large
appropriations for a favored "hawkish" program like poppy
eradication. The President may oppose funding for programs not in
his budget request. Does the President, as Commander in Chief,
have the power to refuse to spend-i.e., to impound-the unsought
funding? For all the extreme claims of constitutional authority by
President George W. Bush and, to a lesser extent, some of his
predecessors, none have revived the lapsed and discredited
impoundment claim. However, enactment of a program opposed
by the President might well spark at least renewed executive
consideration of whether to assert a power not to spend the funds
for the program. That power is impoundment.
1. Impoundment Backgroun 63
The supporters of military impoundments try to show a long
and distinguished history. However, they have only limited support
in trying to isolate attempted military impoundments from
attempted civilian impoundments. Impoundments of defense funds
have occurred more or less together with those of other funds.
Presidents did not generally perform peculiarly military
impoundments, with special invocations of the Commander in
Chief clause for some special category of defense spending.
Underlining this point, the military impoundments that did take
place mostly occurred in peacetime, not wartime. In other words,
Presidents did not try to establish a strong Commander in Chief
impoundment function in the war zone. They simply sought
economy, almost always at home, not staking their claim to
impoundment power on a difference between military and civilian
impoundments.
To briefly review, early instances of recognizable milita
impoundment were few until the modem era after World War II.
263. See generally Ralph S. Abascal & John R. Kramer, Presidential
Impoundment Part I: Historical Genesis and Constitutional Framework, 62
GEO. L.J. 1549 (1974) [hereinafter Abascal & Kramer, Presidential
Impoundment Part 1]; Ralph S. Abascal & John R. Kramer, Presidential
Impoundment Part II: Judicial and Legislative Responses, 63 GEO. L.J. 149
(1974).
264. For example, President Nixon, the leading presidential impounder, had a
live war in Indochina. But, he did not make his impoundment claims with regard
to spending there.
265. Brownell, supra note 65, at 35. President Jefferson impounded funding
for some gunboats. Id. at 31. No substantially recognizable impoundments
occurred until Grant. See id at 33. Even then, although the funds were for the
Army Corps of Engineers, they served domestic non-military purposes of river
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President Truman impounded a portion of the funds for air force
squadrons beyond what he had requested, plus funding for two
carriers,266 on grounds of his Commander in Chief powers.267
President Kennedy impounded funds for a long-range bomber,
fighting the issue to a draw.269 President Johnson slowed down
billions for domestic funding, such as for large highway
programs,27 0 but did not completely cancel projects.271 More
important, President Johnson did not impound defense funding.
Impoundment first really burst onto the legal consciousness
under President Nixon. President Nixon made billions of dollars of
impoundments to cut back on what he saw as excessive
congressional spending. Those Nixon impoundments
overwhelmingly concerned domestic spending, not military
spending. Nixon's impoundments suffered a landmark defeat in the
Supreme Court, completing the picture of impoundment far more
concerning civilian than military spending.272
Congress responded vigorously to impoundments by enacting
funding again with stronger provisions. Courts ruled against the
validity of impoundments, including the Supreme Court in a
statutory (not constitutional) case.273 And, Congress enacted the
Impoundment Control Act of 1974, which closed all the statutory
loopholes cited as allowing impoundment. 274 Also, in the
Impoundment Control Act, Congress gave the President an
alternative channel of making rescission requests that would
receive expedited congressional treatment. 275 As a result of the
and harbor work. Roosevelt impounded relatively large sums, but typically from
domestic activities like public works.
266. Stanton, supra note 34, at 12.
267. See Stassen, supra note 33, at 1185 n.133.
268. See id. at 1163-68. President Eisenhower made some relatively small
impoundments of funds for aircraft and missiles. See Stanton, supra note 34, at 12.
269. In a dramatic interchange, President Kennedy worked out with the angry
House Armed Services Committee Chair, Carl Vinson, a compromise that the
language for the funds be made permissive, rather than mandatory. Stanton,
supra note 34, at 13.
270. One major struggle concerned nuclear powered surface ships. Stassen,
supra note 33, at 1168-76.
271. Stanton, supra note 34, at 13-14.
272. Train v. City of New York, 420 U.S. 35 (1975). The ruling only
concerned statutory grounds. The administration deliberately chose not to make
a constitutional argument, presumably for the unacknowledged but generally
recognized reason that it would lose dramatically.
273. Stanton, supra note 34.
274. See Robert C. Byrd, The Control of the Purse and the Line Item Veto
Act, 35 HARv. J. ON LEGIS. 297, 309 (1998).
275. Stanton, supra note 34.
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Impoundment Control Act, the President must admit that his
proposed impoundments represented merely the lack of
congressional support for his budgetary preferences. There has not
been extensive discussion about impoundments after the political
and legal defeats of President Nixon's efforts to impound.
Since Nixon's time, there have been just a very few
suggestions that a President might revive the all-but-obliterated
claim of power.2 76 The kind of credence and support for a
presidential tool to cut spending that had previously gone into the
impoundment claim instead went into the push for a statutory line
item veto. 277 That effort died when the Supreme Court struck down
the line item veto during the Clinton administration.278 Although
the administration of George W. Bush made some exaggerated
constitutional claims, it does not appear to have invoked visibly a
power to make impoundments whether across the board or just
about military impoundments.2j
2. Lack of Viability of Specifically Military Impoundment
At first glance, the claim of national security impoundment
power may look distinctive and viable. During the heart of the
impoundment controversy in the early 1970s, some commentators
thought so, pointing to precedents of Presidents like Truman and
Kennedy who had asserted the claimed power on specifically
military expenditures.280
However, today the claim of national security impoundment
power looks outdated as well as unsupported. First and foremost,
Presidents hardly employed it after the Nixon era, when it had its
276. See Brownell, supra note 65, at 53-55.
277. See generally Peter E. Quint, The Separation of Powers Under Nixon:
Reflections on Constitutional Liberties and the Rule ofLaw, 1981 DUKE L.J. 1.
278. Roy E. Brownell, II, Comment, The Unnecessary Demise of the Line
Item Veto Act: The Clinton Administration's Costly Failure to Seek
Acknowledgment of "National Security Rescission," 47 AM. U. L. REV. 1273,
1277 (1998).
279. Articles about the Bush administration's claims of executive power
reflect that the impoundment controversy involved the distant past. See
generally Saikrishna B. Prakash, Imperial and Imperiled: The Curious State of
the Executive, 50 WM. & MARY L. REv. 1021 (2008). There were so many
cryptic signing statements on defense appropriations that some statements could
have meant to signify the reservation of a right to impound, but no visible
impoundment controversies ensued.
280. Abascal & Kramer, Presidential Impoundment Part I, supra note 263;
Stassen, supra note 33. The congressional side of the issue did not have great
dignity. Rather, the classic use of the power seemed to have been aiming at the
vulnerable target of congressional pork-barrel spending or bloated weapons
programs.
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rise and fall. It did not survive the triple impact of the Supreme
Court's Train v. City of New York28' case invalidating
impoundments, the Impoundment Control Act, and the general
lapse of far-out executive assertions during Vietnam and
Watergate.
Any number of times during the period from the Nixon
administration to the present, Congress appropriated more for
various military items than Presidents wanted, like unsought or
excess spending on weapons systems. This spending did not get
impounded. 282 The 35-year abandonment of this kind of claim
eloquently speaks of the White House's having lost hope in such a
claim.283 And, a "hawkish" Congress might take up this
controversy with zeal, having picked the program to push from a
strong sense of its political viability. This contrasts with the kind of
impoundments that Presidents have found easier to fight against,
namely, impoundments for pork-barrel, bloated, hard-to-defend
spending.
Furthermore, the President would face the same effectively
unanswerable argument he had always faced in both the
impeachment and the line item veto contexts. Constitutionally, the
President had an array of other tools to deal with disapproved
congressional spending items, above all, the presidential power to
threaten to veto bills unless offending items came out. That had
sufficed for so long that it seemed an unconstitutional and drastic
alteration of the system to supplement it with a novel power to take
offending items out.
This argument has special force after the Bush presidency.
President Bush used veto threats to eliminate or to get redrafted
many items in defense authorization and appropriation bills,
especially in 2007-2008.284 He dramatically demonstrated the
viability of the veto as a tool to maintain the prerogatives of a
Commander in Chief in a war. As with cut-off provisions,
Congress could only make mandatory spending items go through if
281. 420 U.S. 35 (1975).
282. For example, President Clinton did not want all the funds that the
Republican Congress of 1995-2000 appropriated for missile defense systems.
283. Moreover, a President who impounds the funds for a specific item
Congress created to step up a war might thereby choose a greater and more
difficult controversy than he wants. In the impoundment battles of the past,
Presidents like Nixon and Johnson could argue they saved billions of dollars and
thereby had a real impact on budget deficits. The focused challenge to one
controversial wartime item, like poppy eradication spending, depends on the
item's effect on war zone campaigning, and does not involve the vastly larger,
budget-affecting weapon systems for future wars.
284. See discussion supra Part IV.C.3 (concerning the limited items that got
through, like a ban on spending for permanent military bases).
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it felt able to win a difficult kind of public contest with the
President.285
Given that the presidential claim of impoundment power has
been abandoned with good reason, congressional spending
programs as to a shared power in the war zone do not start out with
a presumption or even an automatic material doubt against them.
For a President to revive the claims of a military impoundment
power for just this occasion would revive an enormous controversy
that even President Bush let lie. The situation resembles how
Presidents have not asserted an inherent power to make a line item
veto even of an item in an unwieldy omnibus continuing
resolution. Presidents have trouble explaining why they should
have, as a constitutional matter, this major power when they
already have the veto power.
V. CONCLUSION
This survey and analysis suggests several conclusions. First
and foremost, it invites the viewing of the wartime constitutional
relationship of the President and Congress in a new way. Hitherto,
constitutional analysis viewed the President as always more
"hawkish," more aggressive, and more lusting to expand war than
Congress. Congress only chose between the roles of passive
partner or, if active at all, striving to limit or restrain war.
Now, however, the discussion in this Article suggests a way to
analyze the possibility of a very different Congress, one more
"hawkish" and aggressive than the President. More "hawkish" may
have occurred in the past less often than the Congresses that are
either passive or restraining. But, however often the "hawkish"
Congress occurs, it tests the Constitution in new ways.
Moreover, strategically, the United States faces a new defense
situation after 9/11. The United States faces conflicts, large and
small, in any number of nations that may host enemies. In each
such conflict, the United States may well face choices among
greater or lesser degrees of aggressiveness, variations about which
reasonable national security may disagree in the extent to which
the President and Congress might go different ways.
285. Congress and the President would accuse each other of not making
funding available to American troops who are engaged in the field in fighting a
dangerous foe. The 1990s taught that the public trusted the President more in
such a dispute. Looking back, it was only after a President had undermined the
public trust that Congress could put through Indochina cut-offs in the early
1970s and Boland Amendment cut-offs in the mid-1980s. See generally Fisher,
supra note 19 (discussing several of the President-Congress disputes).
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On the one hand, a crusading President may elicit the
traditional congressional provisions of limitation and restraint.
However, on the other hand, a "less hawkish" President may elicit
provisions from Congress that take an aggressive stance and go
past previous policy lines. These are not wars like World War I
and II, or the Gulf War, as to which, once underway, Congress
does not scrap with Presidents about the scope. It may be a whole
new world.
Furthermore, in shaking up the old ways of thinking, these
different situations play mix and match with the previously clear
correlations of the policy toward war and the support for branches
of government. Traditionally, pro-executive observers felt
comfortable on multiple grounds to challenge congressional
provisions as dovish. Such pro-executive observers would oppose
the cut-off provisions for the Vietnam War, the restraining Boland
Amendments for the Contra war, or the provisions of the Detainee
Treatment Act against extreme treatment. Conversely, pro-
congressional observers supported these provisions, also feeling
comfortable on multiple grounds. However, once the focus of
analysis turns to "hawkish" provisions, such views line up
differently. Those favoring the validity of "hawkish" steps in
wartime must learn sometimes to defend congressional power, and
those opposing such validity must learn to argue the pro-executive
position.
This new kind of thinking may produce a more nuanced, three-
dimensional way of addressing this subject. An observer must take
each constitutional issue on its individual merits rather than take an
ideological line that the executive, or the Congress, must always
prove right; or that the "hawkish," or non-"hawkish," view must
always prove right. Certainly, the author experienced a need in
analyzing this Article's hypotheticals to think more flexibly.
Additionally, this fresh perspective teases apart the separate
significance of the differences among Congress's Article I powers
and among the Commander in Chiefs powers. This Article's
analysis builds, as noted, on recent scholarly work responding to
the formalistic doctrinal theories put forth for President Bush's
actions-recent work that develops the many specific instances in
American history of meaningful constitutional interaction.
Hitherto, observers tended, when discussing appropriation
provisions, to lump all provisions together as one always-
applicable "Congressional Power." And, observers defending the
executive tended, when analyzing constitutional issues, to lump the
different aspects of the Commander in Chief power, and other
powers, together. However, it appears that the "No Appropriation"
clause has a one-way effect, supporting restrictions or limitations
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but not mandatory appropriations. Moreover, it accomplishes little
to try to lump all the different aspects of the theatre of war together
under one sprawling "Commander in Chief' power. The mention
of that power provides no magic incantation to shoo away all
congressional action. Each provision warrants analysis on its own.
This view suggests greater precision than in the past about the
particular congressional authority at issue and the particular
complaint of intrusion upon the Commander in Chief.
Moreover, currently a substantial fraction of the provisions at
issue, or their most relevant immediate precedents, comes aboard
one of the defense authorization or appropriation provisions. The
defense authorization system, and the rest of the work of the armed
services (and sometimes foreign affairs and intelligence)
committees, took on extraordinary importance after World War
11.286 These take on even greater importance after 9/11. Often,
examination of the record of similar provisions considered by these
committees puts a concrete and persuasive context around the
proposal of particular challenged provisions.
Oliver Wendell Holmes said, famously, that "a page of history
[was] worth a volume of logic." 287 Today, that page of history
often comes from the run-up in past authorization and
appropriation bills. For example, when the system of joint
combatant commands has strong statutory roots, it makes little
sense to conjure up some executive genie, some unique
Commander in Chief power to decide military structures, that can
blow the latest provision away. When the impoundment power has
lapsed for almost 40 years of military appropriations, it makes little
sense to drag that genie out for impounding some recent spending
provision.
Thus, the provisions and hypotheticals discussed in this Article
may provide, hopefully, a new frontier for study of the war power.
In these and other respects, it is hoped the Article may enable those
looking for the fresh challenges in analysis of war powers to
awaken out of their "dogmatic slumber."288
286. See generally BLECHMAN, supra note 128.
287. N.Y. Trust Co. v. Eisner, 256 U.S. 345, 349 (1921).
288. IMMANUEL KANT, Introduction to PROLEGOMENA TO ANY FUTURE
METAPHYSICS (Paul Carus trans., 1902) (1783), available at http://
www.mnstate.edu/gracyk/courses/phil%20306/kant-materials/prolegomena2.htm
(Kant's famous self-description of what occurred when he read Hume).
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